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I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2005, Marlyn Riley suffered a heart attack resulting 
from a blood clot that had formed at the site of a stent, a small 
mesh tube surgically implanted in one of his coronary arteries to 
open the artery and improve blood flow.1  The stent was 
manufactured by Cordis, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, and 
had been approved for use by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) after a comprehensive and rigorous review for safety and 
 
 †   Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. 
 1.  Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773 (D. Minn. 2009). 
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efficacy by that agency that led to approval for marketing the device 
on April 24, 2003, about a week before it was implanted in Mr. 
Riley.2  Riley sued Cordis for the injuries that he had suffered as a 
result of the heart attack.  The complaint, filed in federal district 
court in Minnesota, alleged “just about every conceivable legal 
theory,” including allegations of negligence and negligence per se, 
strict liability for design defect and for failure to warn, breach of 
express and implied warranties, negligent misrepresentation, and 
fraud.3  The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, 
arguing that Riley’s claims were preempted by provisions of the 
federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), including the 1976 
Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to that act.4  Riley argued in 
response that his state law claims were not preempted because they 
merely paralleled federal law and would not impose requirements 
on the defendants that were different from or in addition to those 
imposed by federal law.5  The court dismissed all claims, finding 
them to be either expressly or impliedly preempted, or not pled 
with sufficient specificity so that the court could determine whether 
they were preempted.6 
In its analysis, the Riley court referred to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s preemption decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,7 which 
explained that in order to escape the express preemption clause, 
added at 21 U.S.C 360k(a) by the MDA, a state-law claim must be 
premised on the breach of a duty that is the same as the duty 
imposed under the FDCA or one of its implementing regulations.8  
“Put differently,” the Riley court said, “the conduct that is alleged to 
give the plaintiff a right to recover under state law must be conduct 
that is forbidden by the FDCA.”9 
However, that is not the end of the inquiry.  Even if a claim 
escapes express preemption, it may be impliedly preempted in light 
of Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, a case in which the 
 
 2.  Id. at 773–75. 
 3.  Id. at 780 n.5.  The court described the complaint as “the quintessential 
‘kitchen-sink’ complaint, in which he has thrown just about every conceivable legal 
theory up against the wall—sometimes over and over again—in the hope that 
something will stick.”  Id.  The court concluded that the complaint “manage[d] to 
be both prolix and uninformative.”  Id. at 787. 
 4.  Id. at 773. 
 5.  Id. at 781. 
 6.  Id. at 773. 
 7.  552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 8.  Id. at 330. 
 9.  Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 776. 
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Supreme Court held that a private litigant cannot sue a defendant 
for violating the FDCA because enforcement of that act is 
exclusively the province of the FDA.10  Nor can a private litigant 
bring a state-law claim when the substance of that claim is for 
violating the FDCA—“that is, when the state claim would not exist 
if the FDCA did not exist.”11 
In conclusion, the Riley court said that 
Riegel and Buckman create a narrow gap through which a 
plaintiff’s state-law claim must fit if it is to escape express 
or implied preemption.  The plaintiff must be suing for 
conduct that violates the FDCA (or else his claim is 
expressly preempted by § 360k(a)), but the plaintiff must 
not be suing because the conduct violates the FDCA (such 
a claim would be impliedly preempted under Buckman).  
For a state-law claim to survive, then, the claim must be 
premised on conduct that both (1) violates the FDCA and 
(2) would give rise to a recovery under state law even in 
the absence of the FDCA.12 
Not surprisingly, plaintiffs’ lawyers have seized on the concept 
of an un-preempted “parallel” state-law claim in order to avoid the 
preemptive effects of Riegel, generating a considerable amount of 
case law addressing the question: What is a parallel claim?  By 
eliminating plaintiffs’ ability to challenge most product design and 
warning decisions made by the manufacturers of PMA devices, 
Riegel has encouraged more suits focusing on whether 
manufacturers violated FDA regulations, failed to follow the 
manufacturing processes approved by the FDA, withheld data on 
safety and effectiveness in order to secure premarket approval, or 
withheld data in violation of post-approval reporting requirements.  
And in light of Buckman, plaintiffs must also ask, which of these 
parallel claims are preempted?  The surviving claims must avoid 
both express and implied preemption, fitting within the “narrow 
gap” between the two, which was first described by the Riley court.13 
This article will analyze the issues raised by these cases and first 
attempt to extract from them the characteristics of a state-law claim 
that merely parallels federal law—and is thus not expressly 
 
 10.  531 U.S. 341, 349 n.4 (2001).  21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2006) provides that 
“all such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this chapter 
shall be by and in the name of the United States.” 
 11.  Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 777. 
 12.  Id. at 777. 
 13.  Id. 
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preempted—from those state-law claims that are preempted 
because they impose on the defendant a requirement that is 
“different from, or in addition to” federal requirements.14  This 
discussion will show that an important unsettled question in the 
express preemption cases is the question of how specific the 
applicable federal law or regulation must be to amount to a 
“requirement.”15  The answer to this question determines whether 
the scope of express preemption under the MDA is broad or 
narrow.  Second, the article will analyze the implied preemption 
cases in an attempt to identify the features of those cases in which 
the plaintiff is suing for a device manufacturer’s conduct that 
violates the FDCA, but is not suing because the conduct violates the 
FDCA.16  This part of the discussion will show that there also are 
conflicting views about the scope—whether broad or narrow—of 
the implied preemptive effect of the federal law.  Those conflicting 
views are reflected in the courts’ answers to the question of whether 
a state-law claim is impliedly preempted only when it amounts to a 
fraud-on-the-FDA claim, or more broadly whenever it is a private 
action that, in effect, enforces a violation of an FDA requirement. 
Finally, the article will explore the struggle faced in many 
instances at the pleading stage by plaintiffs attempting to craft their 
complaint so as to avoid dismissal on the pleadings.17 
II. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
The doctrine of preemption derives from the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that the 
laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”18  Thus, “state law that conflicts with 
federal law is ‘without effect.’” 19  Congress may preempt state law 
in three ways: “State action may be foreclosed by express language 
in a congressional enactment, by implication from the depth and 
breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies the legislative 
 
 14.  Id. at 775 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1)). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See id. at 777. 
 17.  See, e.g., Gelber v. Stryker Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(plaintiffs’ initial complaint dismissed; “starkly different” amended complaint then 
filed). 
 18.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 19.  Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting 
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)). 
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field, or by implication because of a conflict with a congressional 
enactment.”20 
For preemption purposes, “state law” includes not only 
statutes, regulations, and executive pronouncements, but also 
common law.21  State regulation can be as effectively exerted 
through an award of damages as through some form of preventive 
relief. 
State-law causes of action must give way when such claims 
encroach on the objectives that Congress has addressed directly or 
indirectly through federal statutes or administrative regulations.22  
Thus, “[c]entral to determining questions of preemption is 
divining Congress’ intent.”23 
In the last two decades the United States Supreme Court has 
created a complex body of law surrounding preemption, beginning 
in 1992 with Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,24 which established 
preemption as a major defense in the field of product liability 
litigation.  Three of the Court’s most influential exercises in 
preemption analysis, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,25 Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee,26 and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.27 arose in the 
context of product liability claims involving medical devices. 
III. THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS FOR MEDICAL DEVICES 
Understanding and applying these Supreme Court decisions, 
as well as the wealth of lower court decisions interpreting them, 
requires an understanding of both the complex regulatory scheme 
created by the Medical Device Amendments of 197628 to the 
 
 20.  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (citations 
omitted). 
 21.  See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324–25 (2008); Midwest 
Motor Express, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 512 N.W.2d 881, 887–89 
(Minn. 1994). 
 22.  See, e.g., Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 513, 520–29 (holding failure to warn claims 
preempted by Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which provides that no 
statements relating to smoking and health, other than statements required by the 
Act, “shall be required on any cigarette package”). 
 23.  Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517–18). 
 24.  505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 25.  518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 26.  531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
 27.  552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 28.  Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C. (2006)).  See generally Buckman, 531 U.S. at 344. 
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Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act,29 the statute under which 
the FDA regulates prescription drugs and medical devices, and the 
enforcement provisions of the FDCA.  The statute has both express 
and implied preemptive effects on state-law-based causes of action. 
The approval process for medical devices differs significantly 
depending upon a device’s classification under the law.  The MDA 
divides medical devices into three categories, each with separate 
regulations relating to approval.30  Class I medical devices pose no 
unreasonable risk of illness or injury and are subject to only 
minimal regulation by “general controls.”31  Class II devices, which 
are more complex and pose greater potential health risks than 
Class I devices, are subject to more extensive “special controls.”32  
The most extensive regulation involves Class III devices, which 
present “a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury” or are 
“purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or 
sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial 
importance in preventing impairment of human health.”33  Because 
of their potential risks, Class III medical devices are subject to an 
involved premarket approval (PMA) process within the FDA before 
they may be marketed.  The PMA process requires the applicant to 
demonstrate “a ‘reasonable assurance’ that the device is both 
‘safe . . . [and] effective under the conditions of use prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.’”34 
During the PMA process, manufacturers must present the FDA 
with full reports of all studies that have been published or should 
reasonably be known to the manufacturer; a full description of the 
device’s components, ingredients, and properties, and principles of 
operation; a full description of the methods and facilities for 
 
 29.  Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. §§ 331–397 (2006)). 
 30.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)–(C). 
 31.  Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A).  Examples of Class I devices include bed boards and 
tongue depressors.  21 C.F.R. §§ 880.6070, .6230.  To learn the classification of a 
medical device and its FDA approval status, consult http://www.fda.gov 
/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Consumers/ucm142523.htm. 
 32.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B).  Examples of Class II devices include oxygen 
masks, tampons, and syringes.  21 C.F.R. §§ 880.5860, 868.5655, 884.5460. 
 33.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).  Examples of Class III devices include hip and 
knee replacement components, intraocular lenses, and pacemakers.  See, e.g., 21 
C.F.R. § 870.3610. 
 34.  Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 344 (2001) 
(alteration in original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)(A)–(B) (1994)); see also 
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
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manufacturing, processing, and packaging of the device; samples, 
or device components required by the FDA; and an example of the 
proposed labeling.35  The FDA also may refer the device to an 
outside panel of experts36 and may ask the manufacturer for 
additional information before deciding whether to grant 
approval.37  PMA of a device may be conditioned on adherence to 
various requirements.38 
However, Class III devices that fall within one of three 
recognized exceptions are exempt from the time-consuming PMA 
process.39  One exception allows for “grandfathered” devices 
manufactured prior to MDA enactment to remain on the market.40  
A second exception allows a manufacturer to show that its product 
is “substantially equivalent” to devices in existence in 1976 so that 
approval can be expedited through what is known as “premarket 
notification” or the “§ 510(k) process.”41  A substantial proportion 
of Class III device approvals are made under this expedited 
§ 510(k) review process42 that focuses not on the device’s safety and 
efficacy, but on its equivalency to an already approved device.  And 
finally, a third exception is the investigational device exemption, or 
“IDE,” which applies to experimental technology and allows for 
unapproved devices to be used in research trials involving human 
subjects.43  The purpose of IDE approval is “to encourage . . . the 
 
 35.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1). 
 36.  21 C.F.R. § 814.44(a) (2012). 
 37.  21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(H) (Supp. 2011).  
 38.  Id. §§ 360e(d)(1)(B)(ii), 360j(e)(1) (2006).  For example, the device 
may be restricted to use in patients who do not have certain medical conditions.  
Id. § 360j(e)(1). 
 39.  PMA review is estimated to consume approximately 1200 hours of FDA 
time.  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 318 (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996).  
 40.  21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A). 
 41.  Id. § 360e(b)(1)(B); Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 221 (6th Cir. 
2000) (noting that “premarket notification” is referred to as “the § 510(k) process” 
and that this limited form of review “averages only 20 hours of review as opposed 
to some 1200 hours in the PMA process”). 
 42.  The majority of Class III devices submitted for FDA consideration—
hundreds each year—are variants on products like standard pacemakers that were 
already in the market when the MDA was enacted in 1976.  Only about twenty to 
fifty new PMA applications are reviewed in a typical year.  Barnaby J. Feder, Medical 
Device Ruling Redraws Lines on Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/business/22device.html.  “In 2005, for 
example, the FDA authorized the marketing of 3,148 devices under § 510(k) and 
granted premarket approval to just 32 devices.”  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317 (citing P. 
HUTT, R. MERRILL & L. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 992 (3d ed. 2007)). 
 43.  21 U.S.C. §§ 360e(a), 360j(g).  An IDE permits a manufacturer to market 
7
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discovery and development of useful devices intended for human 
use and to that end to maintain optimum freedom for scientific 
investigators in their pursuit of that purpose.”44  IDE approval 
permits a device to be used in a clinical setting to gather data for a 
PMA.45 
Approval by the FDA of a device for marketing does not end 
the regulatory process, however.  After a device is approved, the 
MDA forbids any changes in the design of the device, its 
manufacturing processes, labeling, or any other aspect of the 
device that would affect safety or efficacy without first filing a 
supplemental PMA application and obtaining the FDA’s approval 
of the change.46  These supplemental applications are “evaluated 
under largely the same criteria as an initial application.”47 
A medical device manufacturer must also comply with post-
approval reporting requirements.48  These requirements include 
the submission of reports from clinical investigations or studies 
involving the device of which the manufacturer knows or should 
know,49 and reports of incidents in which the device “[m]ay have 
caused or contributed to a death or serious injury” or has 
malfunctioned and “would be likely to cause or contribute to a 
death or serious injury, if the malfunction were to recur.”50  The 
FDA has the power to withdraw approval of the device based on 
newly reported information or existing data and must withdraw its 
approval if it determines that a device is unsafe or ineffective under 
the conditions in its labeling.51  The agency also has the authority to 
order a labeling change based on newly acquired information52 and 
the power to require the manufacturer to notify all affected 
individuals, or require repair or replacement of a device if it 
concludes that the device “presents an unreasonable risk of 
substantial harm to the public.”53 
 
“a device that otherwise would be required to comply with a performance standard 
or to have premarket approval to be shipped lawfully for the purpose of 
conducting investigations of that device.”  21 C.F.R. § 812.1 (2012). 
 44.  21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(1). 
 45.  Id. § 360j(g)(2)–(3). 
 46.  Id. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i); 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(a). 
 47.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319. 
 48.  21 U.S.C. § 360i (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 49.  21 C.F.R. § 814.84(b)(2). 
 50.  Id. § 803.50(a). 
 51.  21 U.S.C §§ 360e(e)(1), 360h(e) (2006); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319–20. 
 52.  21 U.S.C. § 360f(a)(2). 
 53.  Id. § 360h. 
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All medical devices, not just Class III devices, must comply with 
the FDA’s current good manufacturing practices (CGMP) 
regulations,54 which set forth a quality control system and “govern 
the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the 
design, manufacture, packaging, labeling, storage, installation, and 
servicing of all finished devices intended for human use.”55  The 
manufacturer must adopt procedures and controls relating to 
product design and manufacturing, quality assurance, and 
corrective or preventive action, but the CGMP requirements “leave 
it up to the manufacturer to institute a quality control system 
specific to the medical device it produces to ensure that such 
device is safe and effective.”56 
Finally, the FDCA limits the power to enforce the act to the 
FDA and to the States.  Section 337 of the act provides that, except 
for the power granted to States to sue in their own name for 
violations of the act, “all . . . proceedings for the enforcement, or to 
restrain violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of 
the United States.”57  This provision is meant to preclude private 
enforcement of the act.  “Congress has determined that there 
should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation [of 
the FDCA].”58 
IV. EXPRESS PREEMPTION UNDER THE MDA—LOHR AND RIEGEL 
In addition to its many procedural requirements, the MDA 
also contains an express preemption provision: 
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish 
or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for 
 
 54.  Id. § 360j(f); 21 C.F.R. § 820.1–.250. 
 55.  21 C.F.R. § 820.1(a)(1). 
 56.  Horowitz v. Stryker Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 271, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
Because the regulation must apply to so many different types of devices, 
the regulation does not prescribe in detail how a manufacturer must 
produce a specific device.  Rather, the regulation provides the framework 
that all manufacturers must follow by requiring that manufacturers 
develop and follow procedures and fill in the details that are appropriate 
to a given device according to the current state-of-the-art manufacturing 
for that specific device. 
Quality System (QS) Regulation/Medical Device Good Manufacturing                                   
Practices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov 
/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/postmarketrequirements 
/qualitysystemsregulations/default.htm (last updated Apr. 28, 2011). 
 57.  21 U.S.C. § 337(a). 
 58.  Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986). 
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human use any requirement— 
       (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, 
and 
       (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the 
device or to any other matter included in a requirement 
applicable to the device under this chapter.59 
Under the FDA’s interpretive regulations, “any requirement” by a 
state includes any court decision that “is different from, or in 
addition to, any requirement applicable to such device under any 
provision of the act and which relates to the safety or effectiveness 
of the device.”60  However, such “[s]tate or local requirements are 
preempted only when the [FDA] has established specific 
counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements 
applicable to a particular device.”61 
The United States Supreme Court first addressed whether the 
MDA preempts certain common law products liability claims in 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.62  The plaintiff in the case, Lora Lohr, was 
“dependent on pacemaker technology for the proper functioning 
of her heart.”63  She required emergency heart surgery when her 
pacemaker failed, allegedly as the result of a defective lead, the part 
of the device that “transmits the heartbeat-steadying electrical 
signal from the ‘pulse generator’ to the heart itself.”64  The 
pacemaker lead was manufactured by Medtronic.65  It was a Class III 
device approved by the FDA under section 510(k) of the MDA after 
having been found “‘substantially equivalent to devices introduced 
into interstate commerce’ prior to the effective date of the Act.”66  
In its approval letter to the manufacturer, the agency emphasized 
that its “determination should not be construed as an endorsement 
of the pacemaker lead’s safety.”67  Lohr and her husband filed suit 
in a Florida state court against Medtronic, which removed the case 
to federal district court and filed a motion for summary judgment, 
 
 59.  21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
 60.  21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b). 
 61.  Id. § 808.1(d).  These interpretive regulations reflect the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) discussed infra in 
notes 72–86 and accompanying text. 
 62.  518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 63.  Id. at 480. 
 64.  Id. at 480–81. 
 65.  Id. at 480. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/2
  
1044 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:4 
arguing that Lohr’s claims for negligence and strict liability were 
preempted under § 360k(a) of the MDA.68 
In its decision, the Court in Lohr held that claims arising from 
alleged defects in a pacemaker lead, a Class III device that had 
been approved under the section 510(k) notification process as 
“substantially equivalent” to an already-approved device, were not 
preempted by the MDA’s express preemption provision because 
the FDA had not reviewed the device for safety and effectiveness 
but only had determined that it satisfied the law’s equivalency 
standard.69  State law regulating the device’s safety did not, 
therefore, conflict with any FDA safety determinations.  However, 
the Court also said that even if there were FDA-established safety 
standards applying to a device, “[n]othing in § 360k denies [the 
state] the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for 
violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel federal 
requirements.”70  The Lohr court’s conclusion that a “parallel” claim 
is not expressly preempted was confirmed more than a decade later 
in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.71 
In 1996, Charles Riegel underwent an angioplasty to dilate his 
coronary artery.72  During an angioplasty, a balloon catheter is used 
by a physician to open patients’ clogged arteries, essentially by 
inserting the catheter into the clogged artery, inflating it like a 
balloon, and then deflating and removing the catheter.73  During 
Riegel’s procedure, his doctor inserted an Evergreen Balloon 
Catheter, manufactured by Medtronic, into Riegel’s artery and 
inflated the device several times, up to a pressure of ten 
atmospheres.74  On the final inflation, the catheter burst, and 
Riegel began to rapidly deteriorate.75  He developed a complete 
heart block, lost consciousness, was intubated and placed on 
advanced life support, and was rushed to the operating room for 
 
 68.  Id. at 481. 
 69.  Id. at 495. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 72.  Id. at 320. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  The warning label stated that the Evergreen catheter was contraindicated 
for use in patients with coronary artery disease like Riegel’s and also warned that it 
should not be inflated beyond its rated burst pressure of eight atmospheres.  
Despite these label warnings, Riegel’s doctor chose to use this device in this way.  
Id. 
 75.  Id. 
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emergency coronary bypass surgery.76  Riegel survived, but suffered 
severe injuries and permanent disabilities.77  The FDA had 
approved Medtronic’s PMA for the Evergreen Balloon Catheter in 
1994 and had subsequently approved Medtronic’s PMA 
supplements, which requested approval for revised labeling for the 
device.78 
Riegel and his wife sued Medtronic, alleging that the catheter 
was designed, labeled, and manufactured in a manner that violated 
state common law and that these defects caused Riegel’s injuries.79  
The complaint raised a number of state common law claims that 
were dismissed by the federal district court, which held that the 
claims were preempted under the MDA, a result affirmed on 
appeal by the Second Circuit.80 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the MDA 
preemption clause does bar common-law tort claims challenging 
the safety or effectiveness of a PMA-approved medical device, such 
as the balloon catheter involved in Riegel, that has undergone the 
full-blown “rigorous” FDA premarket approval process.81  
“Generalized common law theories of liability . . . are precisely the 
types of claims the MDA sought to preempt.”82  The court affirmed 
the view taken in earlier preemption cases that conflicting state law 
“requirements” may take the form of common-law duties, 
explaining that common-law liability is premised on the existence 
of a legal duty—a state-law obligation—and that a tort judgment for 
damages can be “a potent method of governing conduct and 
controlling policy.”83  However, the court also said that state law 
requirements are preempted only if they are “different from, or in 
addition to” federal requirements, affirming Lohr on this point.84  
Such claims are not preempted if the state-imposed duties merely 
 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 320–21. 
 81.  Id. at 317–18, 323 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 
(1996)). 
 82.  Williams v. Cyberonics, Inc., 388 F. App’x 169, 171 (3rd Cir. 2010) (citing 
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 325). 
 83.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 324 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 
504, 521 (1992)). 
 84.  Id. at 312 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1)); see also Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow 
Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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“‘parallel,’ rather than add to, federal requirements.”85  Therefore, 
in order to determine whether a particular claim is preempted, a 
court must “look through the general duties imposed by the state-
law causes of action and consider the effect a successful lawsuit 
asserting those causes of action would have and determine whether 
they threaten the federal PMA process requirements.”86 
Typical design defect and failure to warn claims, whether 
brought as strict liability or negligence claims, essentially challenge 
the design or warning choice made by the manufacturer.  But PMA 
approval of a Class III device includes specific FDA examination 
and approval of a device’s design and accompanying label 
warnings.87  Therefore, a state-law-based determination that a 
device was defectively designed or was not accompanied by an 
adequate warning would be in direct conflict with the FDA’s prior 
determination to the contrary.  For example, in Clark v. Medtronic, 
Inc.,88 the plaintiff, who had received an implantable cardiac 
defibrillator (ICD) to treat a heart arrhythmia, experienced 
“inappropriate shocks” from the device and eventually had it 
replaced with a different ICD.89  He brought several state-law claims 
including claims for negligent design and negligently failing to 
warn of the shock risk.90  The federal district court ruled that all of 
his claims were preempted.91  Clark relied on the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitor for the proposition that, if the manufacturer had fully 
complied with FDA requirements, he would not have experienced 
problems with the device and that, therefore, the device must not 
have been manufactured in accordance with the FDA’s premarket 
approval requirements.92  But the court pointed out that an ICD is a 
complex device that “can fail for a variety of reasons, including 
medical complications, body rejection phenomena, allergic 
reaction, and surgical techniques, all of which occur without 
someone acting in a negligent manner.”93  Premarket approval, 
based upon the FDA’s balancing of a device’s benefits as well as 
 
 85.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330. 
 86.  Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig Div. Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 929–30 (5th Cir. 
2006). 
 87.  21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1) (2006) (listing PMA application requirements). 
 88.  572 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 89.  Id. at 1092. 
 90.  Id. at 1093. 
 91.  Id. at 1095. 
 92.  Id. at 1094–95. 
 93.  Id. at 1094 (quoting Mozes v. Medtronic, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1129 
(D. Minn. 1998)). 
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risks, does not guarantee that an approved device is completely 
safe.94  The FDA approved warnings about this shock risk when it 
approved the device95 and, therefore, the plaintiff’s claim, that the 
device did not comply with federal requirements simply because it 
had caused an inappropriate shock, would impose a state-law 
requirement in addition to the federal requirements.96 
Such claims also sometimes come in the guise of a claim for 
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,97 but again, if 
the alleged reason that the product is unmerchantable is because 
of some aspect of its design or warnings, the claim directly conflicts 
with prior FDA approval of the adequacy of the device’s design and 
labeling and is thus preempted.  Similarly, if a breach of express 
warranty claim is based on the device’s label, it, too, is preempted.98 
In the typical manufacturing defect case, however, the essence 
of the claim is that the device was not made the way it was supposed 
to be made according to its design.  Therefore, a state-law-based 
determination of a manufacturing defect does not necessarily 
conflict with the FDA’s approval of the device’s design for the 
simple reason that the device was not made according to its design 
as required by federal law.  The state and federal claims may be 
equivalent.  For example, a claim that a device contains a 
manufacturing defect because it violates FDA requirements for 
manufacturing quality control may be an un-preempted parallel 
claim.99  The state-law requirement of a non-defective product 
would be the equivalent of the federal-law requirement that a 
device be manufactured in conformance with federal regulations 
designed to assure a device’s manufacturing quality. 
 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 1095. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See 27 MICHAEL K. STEENSON, J. DAVID PRINCE & SARAH L. BREW, 
MINNESOTA PRACTICE: PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 5.14 (2006). 
 98.  Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 787 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 99.  As discussed infra in Part IX in greater detail, an important issue in such 
cases, and one of the great divides among the lower federal courts’ resolution of 
this issue, is just how detailed the FDA’s regulatory requirements for the device 
must be in order to be regarded as a “requirement.”  Compare Bausch v. Stryker 
Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 554–556 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that the FDA’s Quality 
Control Regulations and CGMP are sufficiently specific to be regarded as a 
“requirement”), with In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig. 
(Sprint Fidelis Leads II), 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding to the contrary). 
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V. IMPLIED PREEMPTION UNDER THE FDCA—BUCKMAN 
Even if a product defect claim against a medical device 
manufacturer is not expressly preempted because it parallels 
federal law, it may nonetheless be impliedly preempted.  After Lohr, 
some courts concluded that state common-law fraud-on-the-FDA 
claims were not preempted when FDA approval of a drug or 
medical device was secured through the manufacturer’s material 
misrepresentations or omissions to the FDA during the approval 
process.100  If the FDA’s approval had been obtained by 
misrepresentation, then the agency’s safety determination as to the 
device should not be regarded as a legitimate federal requirement 
with which state law might conflict.  The United States Supreme 
Court examined this issue, again addressing preemption in the 
context of the MDA, in Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee.101  In 
Buckman, plaintiffs injured by orthopedic bone screws brought suit 
alleging that the defendant, a regulatory consultant, had made 
fraudulent representations to the FDA in order to obtain approval 
to market the devices.102  The manufacturer was responsible for the 
design of the bone screws, but was not a defendant here.103  Instead, 
the consultant was sued for the manner in which the application 
for the device’s approval was presented to the FDA.104  As in Lohr, 
the device had been approved through the less rigorous § 510(k) 
process.105  But unlike the Lohr Court, the Buckman Court, without 
any explanation, declined to address whether the express 
preemption provision of § 360k applied and instead undertook an 
implied preemption analysis, holding that the plaintiffs’ fraud-on-
the-FDA claims were preempted.106  The court explained that the 
§ 510(k) process created a “comprehensive scheme” for 
 
 100.  See, e.g., Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1374–75 (11th Cir. 
1999) (holding that state fraud-on-the-FDA claims were not preempted because 
the FDA’s approval imposed no specific “requirement” on a device that could 
conflict with state law). 
 101.  531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
 102.  Id. at 343. 
 103.  See Thomas O. McGarity, Beyond Buckman: Wrongful Manipulation of the 
Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 549, 572 (2002).  The 
manufacturer, AcroMed, was also sued, but AcroMed was dismissed pursuant to a 
global settlement.  Id.  Fraud-on-the-FDA was the only claim against the regulatory 
consultant.  Id. 
 104.  Buckman, 531 U.S. at 343. 
 105.  Id. at 346. 
 106.  Id. at 348 n.2 (expressing “no view on whether these claims [were] 
subject to express pre-emption under 21 U.S.C. § 360k”). 
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determining whether to approve a device under the “substantially 
equivalent” standard.107  That scheme establishes exactly what a 
manufacturer must submit to the FDA and empowers the FDA to 
demand further information.108  Most significantly, the FDA itself is 
charged with policing fraud in connection with manufacturers’ 
submissions and has a variety of enforcement options that allow it 
to make “a measured response to suspected fraud.”109  The Court 
said that “[t]he FDCA leaves no doubt that it is the Federal 
Government rather than private litigants who are authorized to file 
suit for noncompliance with the medical device provisions.”110  
Therefore, permitting the plaintiffs’ state fraud claims would 
conflict with the FDA’s responsibility to police fraud in accordance 
with its own judgment and objectives under the FDCA.111 
For that reason, a unanimous Court concluded that allowing 
state fraud-on-the-FDA claims would “exert an extraneous pull on 
the scheme established by Congress.”112  The Court explained that 
“[a]s a practical matter, complying with the FDA’s detailed 
regulatory regime in the shadow of 50 States’ tort regimes [would] 
dramatically increase the burdens facing potential applicants.”113  
Consequently, medical device manufacturers might decline to 
develop or submit potentially beneficial devices for FDA approval 
out of fear that they might be exposed to “unpredictable civil 
liability,” thereby defeating the federal goal of ensuring the 
availability of efficacious medical devices.114  The court concluded 
that state fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflict with the federal medical 
device regime established by Congress and are therefore 
preempted.115 
In so finding, the Supreme Court expressly distinguished 
fraud-on-the-FDA claims from other state tort claims for inadequate 
labeling, such as those the Court had previously addressed in Lohr: 
“[A]lthough [Lohr] can be read to allow certain state-law causes of 
actions that parallel federal safety requirements, it does not and 
cannot stand for the proposition that any violation of the FDCA will 
 
 107.  Id. at 348. 
 108.  See id. 
 109.  Id. at 349. 
 110.  Id. at 349 n.4. 
 111.  Id. at 350–51. 
 112.  Id. at 353. 
 113.  Id. at 350. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 348. 
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support a state-law claim.”116  The critical distinction between Lohr 
and Buckman is the fundamental difference in the source of the 
cause of action.  In Lohr, the cause of action was based in 
traditional state tort law and pre-existed the FDCA.  In Buckman, on 
the other hand, the fraud-on-the-FDA claim was premised entirely 
on the federal regulatory scheme created by the FDA.117  This 
distinction may explain why the court opted to forego an express 
preemption analysis, which focuses on state statutory and common 
law “requirements,” and to rely instead upon a conflict preemption 
theory, which is clearly implicated when the objectives and 
operation of a congressional regulatory scheme are threatened. 
VI. THE “NARROW GAP” 
As indicated at the outset, a state-law-based product liability 
claim against a Class III medical device manufacturer faces 
significant hurdles to fit within the “narrow gap” so aptly described 
in Riley.118  The claim may be expressly preempted because it would 
effectively impose upon the manufacturer a requirement that is 
different from or in addition to the requirements imposed upon 
the manufacturer by the FDA under federal law.  According to Lohr 
and Riegel, that is especially likely to be the case if the device has 
undergone a full PMA review in order to obtain FDA approval for 
marketing.  And if it is not expressly preempted, it may, according 
to Buckman, nevertheless be impliedly preempted because 
recognition of the state-law claim would “exert an extraneous pull 
on the scheme established by Congress.”119  In order to survive 
dismissal, the claims must avoid both express and implied 
preemption.  In determining whether a state-law claim is 
preempted, several key questions must be answered. 
VII.  WHAT IS A “PARALLEL” CLAIM? 
Riegel makes clear that state-law-based claims are expressly 
preempted only if they impose requirements that are “different 
from, or in addition to” federal requirements, but are not 
preempted if the state-imposed duties merely “‘parallel,’ rather 
 
 116.  Id. at 353. 
 117.  See id. at 347 (“Policing fraud against federal agencies is hardly ‘a field 
which the States have traditionally occupied’ . . . .”). 
 118.  Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 119.  531 U.S. at 353. 
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than add to, federal requirements.”120  This brief description of the 
claims that survive express preemption is sufficiently vague to have 
resulted in varying interpretations by courts seeking to implement 
the Riegel ruling.121  While many cases have raised the issue of 
whether a state-law claim merely parallels federal requirements 
applicable to a medical device, they are inconsistent in their 
outcomes and are not entirely clear about whether there is a core 
test for parallelism.  In particular, there is a split of authority 
among the federal circuits as to whether the state-law claim must be 
parallel to a federal requirement specific to the device in question 
or whether it must be parallel only to a more general, industry-wide 
requirement. 
So what makes a state-law claim “parallel” to a federal-law claim 
and just how “parallel” must the state and federal requirements be? 
VIII.  WHAT IS A FEDERAL “REQUIREMENT”? 
“In order for a state requirement to be parallel to a federal 
requirement . . . the plaintiff must show that the requirements are 
‘genuinely equivalent.’  State and federal requirements are not 
genuinely equivalent if a manufacturer could be held liable under 
the state law without having violated the federal law.”122  Thus, a 
state-law claim must be premised on the breach of a duty that is the 
same as the duty imposed under the FDCA or one of its 
implementing regulations.123 
Genuine equivalency, therefore, first requires that there be a 
federal requirement applicable to the device.124  In Walker v. 
Medtronic, Inc.,125 the plaintiff sued, alleging that an implanted pain 
medication pump manufactured by the defendant caused the 
death of her husband when it infused a fatal overdose of 
 
 120.  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008). 
 121.  See Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The 
contours of the parallel claim exception were not addressed in Riegel and are as-yet 
ill-defined.”). 
 122.  McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 454 (2005)). 
 123.  See Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 776. 
 124.  See, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 
2011) (“Parallel claims must . . . specifically . . . allege that ‘[the] defendant 
violated a particular federal specification referring to the device at issue.’” 
(quoting Ilarraza v. Medtronic, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
 125.  670 F.3d 569 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 162 (2012). 
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medication into her husband’s system.126  The FDA had approved 
this PMA device designed with a certain flow rate and a delivery 
accuracy of plus or minus fifteen percent, but had not set a formal 
performance standard requiring that the pump always remain 
within that range.127  Indeed, warnings accompanying the device 
said that the pump’s flow characteristics could change over time 
and possibly result in a drug overdose.128  Walker argued that her 
complaint stated an un-preempted parallel claim when she alleged 
that the pump had failed to adhere to the plus or minus fifteen 
percent specification.129  However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal of the claim on preemption grounds.130  
The court explained that because the FDA had not established for 
the device a formal performance standard requiring that the device 
always remain within fifteen percent of its designed flow rate, there 
was no binding federal requirement that the device do so.131  Thus, 
a failure to remain within those parameters was not a violation of 
an FDA requirement.132 
Even where federal law permits a device manufacturer to act in 
a particular way, that permission does not impose a federal 
“requirement.”  For example, in McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., the 
plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of a tremor control device 
implanted in the brain of a patient with Parkinson’s disease.133  As 
part of its approval of this Class III device, the FDA required 
Medtronic to maintain contact information for patients implanted 
with the device and also required specific warnings regarding 
“electrocautery” and “diathermy” that were provided in the 
manuals for physicians and patients.134  Electrocautery is the 
burning or searing of tissue caused by an electrically heated 
instrument.135  Diathermy is the localized heating of tissue for 
therapeutic purposes by means of passing an electric current 
through the tissue.136  After McMullen had been implanted with two 
of these devices in May of 2000, one on each side of his brain, he 
 
 126.  Id. at 576. 
 127.  Id. at 574. 
 128.  Id. at 574–75. 
 129.  Id. at 576. 
 130.  Id. at 581. 
 131.  Id. at 578. 
 132.  See id. at 577–78. 
 133.  421 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 134.  Id. at 485. 
 135.  Id. at 485 n.1. 
 136.  Id. 
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experienced considerable improvement in his Parkinson’s 
symptoms.137  However, after a visit in March 2001 to his dentist for 
a treatment that possibly involved diathermy or electrocautery, he 
experienced a decline in the control of his Parkinson’s symptoms, 
which continued despite further surgeries to replace components 
of the implanted devices.138  In January 2001, in the wake of an 
anecdotal report of brain injury to a Parkinson’s patient after a 
dental treatment that involved the use of diathermy, Medtronic 
began an investigation that resulted in the sending of warning 
letters, in May 2001, to patients implanted with the device and their 
doctors.139  The letters specifically warned against diathermy 
treatment, saying that it “can cause tissue damage and can result in 
severe injury or death.”140 
McMullen and his wife sued, alleging that Medtronic had 
breached its postsale duty to warn of the risks associated with 
diathermy treatment.141  Their claim was dismissed by the district 
court on preemption grounds, a result affirmed on appeal by the 
Seventh Circuit.142  The key issue was whether Medtronic was 
required by federal law to provide an additional warning between 
January 2001, when Medtronic learned of the anecdotal report, 
and March 2001, when McMullen underwent the dental procedure 
and was injured.143 
In order to change the warnings for an approved Class III 
device, a manufacturer must first obtain the FDA’s approval144 but is 
permitted to temporarily amend a warning pending FDA approval 
of the requested change.145  The court concluded that because this 
regulation simply allowed but did not require a warning change 
prior to FDA approval it did not amount to a federal requirement: 
“Where a federal requirement permits a course of conduct and the 
state makes it obligatory, the state’s requirement is in addition to 
the federal requirement and thus is preempted.”146 
In Heisner v. Genzyme Corp.,147 the plaintiff’s wife died as a result 
 
 137.  Id. at 485. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at 486. 
 142.  Id. at 486, 490. 
 143.  Id. at 486–87. 
 144.  See 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(a) (2012). 
 145.  21 C.F.R. § 814.39(d)(2)(i). 
 146.  McMullen, 421 F.3d at 489. 
 147.  No. 08-C-593, 2010 WL 894054 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2010). 
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of an allergic reaction to a chemical in a film barrier designed to 
prevent postsurgical adhesions.148  The barrier was a Class III 
medical device approved pursuant to the PMA process and 
manufactured by the defendant.149  Her husband sued, claiming 
that the manufacturer violated a state common-law duty to update 
the device’s warning label upon acquiring information about the 
dangerous nature of the synthesized acid in the product that 
caused the fatal allergic reaction.150  But the court found that, even 
though the manufacturer could have temporarily updated its label 
while awaiting FDA approval of the change, there was no MDA 
requirement that the manufacturer amend its label to provide a 
warning of a potential allergic reaction.151  The court concluded 
that the claim was preempted because there was no federal duty 
“‘genuinely equivalent’ to the duty that Plaintiff claims exists under 
state common law.”152 
IX. GENERAL OR DEVICE-SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT? 
The most important unresolved issue in determining whether 
there is a federal “requirement” applicable to a medical device is 
whether the FDA’s regulatory requirements must be specifically 
applicable to the device in question or may be a more generally 
applicable requirement applying to entire categories of devices or 
manufacturer activities. 
The FDA typically requires, in the labeling of an approved 
medical device, specific instructions for use of the device and 
warnings about potential adverse events that could result from its 
use.  For example, the FDA may require a manual to be given to 
patients who have had a pacemaker implanted which contains a 
specific warning to keep “at least 24 inches (60 centimeters) away 
from the heat source” of an electric induction cooktop.153  Or FDA 
requirements may be more generally applicable, such as its CGMP.  
 
 148.  Id. at *1. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at *3. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id.; see also McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 
2005) (“Where a federal requirement permits a course of conduct and the state 
makes it obligatory, the state’s requirement is in addition to federal requirement 
and thus is preempted.”). 
 153.  See MEDTRONIC INC., HEART FAILURE PACEMAKER WITH DEFIBRILLATION 
PATIENT MANUAL 39 (2009), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs 
/pdf/P010031S232c.pdf. 
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These regulations represent an “umbrella” approach to regulation 
applicable to “many different types of devices” and do “not 
prescribe in detail how a manufacturer must produce a specific 
device.”154  They provide “flexibility,” allowing “each manufacturer 
to establish requirements for each type or family of devices that will 
result in devices that are safe and effective, and to establish 
methods and procedures to design, produce, distribute, etc. devices 
that meet the quality system requirements.”155 
This issue of whether a state-law-based claim must be parallel 
to a device-specific, or only a more general industry-wide, FDA 
requirement was discussed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit in the context of a motion to dismiss in In re 
Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Product Liability Litigation (Sprint 
Fidelis Leads II).156  Plaintiffs across the country filed actions against 
Medtronic alleging defects in the leads (small wires) connecting an 
implantable cardiac defibrillator (ICD) directly to a patient’s heart 
muscle to carry an electrical impulse.157  These complaints followed 
in the wake of a recall by Medtronic of ICDs using a lead termed by 
the manufacturer as a “Sprint Fidelis” lead.158  At the time of the 
recall, approximately 257,000 Sprint Fidelis leads remained 
implanted in patients.159  Scores of these claims were consolidated 
for pretrial proceedings by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation.160  Medtronic filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims 
in the master complaint, arguing preemption and citing Riegel.161  
The federal district court granted the motion.162 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal,163 
agreeing that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted under Riegel 
and stating that “the crucial question on appeal is whether these 
claims are parallel claims that avoid preemption because they 
would not impose state requirements ‘different from or in addition 
to’ the federal requirements established by PMA approval of the 
 
 154.  Quality System (QS) Regulation/Medical Device Good Manufacturing Practices, 
supra note 56. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 157.  Id. at 1203. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig. (Sprint Fidelis 
Leads I), 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1154 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 1154–55. 
 162.  Id. at 1165. 
 163.  Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d at 1209. 
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Sprint Fidelis lead.”164 
The court first determined that the failure to warn, and related 
claims, were preempted because “[e]ven if federal law allowed 
Medtronic to provide additional warnings, as [p]laintiffs alleged, 
any state law imposing an additional requirement is preempted” 
because it is a requirement in addition to the federal 
requirement.165  Then the court decided that the design defect 
claims were also preempted because “they are attacks on the 
risk/benefit analysis that led the FDA to approve” the device and 
such claims are expressly preempted.166 
The plaintiffs also alleged that the leads had a manufacturing 
defect because Medtronic’s manufacturing processes were not in 
compliance with the FDA’s CGMP found in the Quality System 
Regulations (QSR) applicable to all medical devices.167  The district 
court had concluded that these manufacturing defect claims were 
preempted because the CGMP provide only general objectives for 
quality systems applicable to all device manufacturers, and plaintiffs 
had failed to identify any specific federal manufacturing 
requirement that was violated.168  Consequently, the plaintiffs had 
not alleged a parallel manufacturing defect claim with the detail 
required by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly169 to avoid preemption 
under Riegel.170  On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the district court 
had held them to an impossible pleading standard because the 
FDA’s specific manufacturing requirements applicable to this 
particular product were in the agency’s PMA approval files, which 
were not accessible without discovery.171  However, as the court of 
appeals explained, the plaintiffs had alleged in their pleading that 
“state law entitles every person who has an implanted Sprint Fidelis 
lead[]” to relief because all such leads have an unreasonably high 
 
 164.  Id. at 1205. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at 1206. 
 167.  Id.  See generally 21 C.F.R. Part 820 (2012). 
 168.  Sprint Fidelis Leads I, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1157–58 (D. Minn. 2009) 
(explaining that CGMP are “too generic” and provide only “general objectives” for 
device manufacturers, and stating that “[i]n the absence of any specific 
requirement in the [CGMP] . . . holding Medtronic liable for such a 
[manufacturing] ‘defect’ would impose requirements ‘different from, or in 
addition to’ those under federal law”). 
 169.  550 U.S. 544, 554–56 (2007). 
 170.  Sprint Fidelis Leads I, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1157–59. 
 171.  Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d at 1206. 
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risk of failure.172  This argument amounts to a design defect, not a 
manufacturing defect, claim.173  “Thus, as pleaded and argued, the 
manufacturing defect claims are not parallel, they are a frontal 
assault on the FDA’s decision to approve” the device.174 
The court appeared to conclude that any applicable federal 
requirement must be specific to the device.  First, it said nothing to 
contradict the reasoning underlying the district court’s dismissal of 
the complaint.  That court had said that CGMP “require 
manufacturers to develop their own quality-system controls . . . and 
they are inherently flexible,” and therefore concluded that these 
regulations were “simply too generic” and did “not prescribe in 
detail how a manufacturer must produce a specific device.”175  “In 
the absence of any specific requirement in the CGMP[]/QSR that 
Medtronic weld the Sprint Fidelis leads in a certain fashion, 
holding Medtronic liable for such a welding ‘defect’ would impose 
requirements ‘different from, or in addition to’ those under 
federal law.”176  Second, the appellate court said that “courts must 
exercise [care] in applying Riegel’s parallel claim principle at the 
pleading stage, particularly to manufacturing defect claims.  But 
here, plaintiffs simply failed to adequately plead that Medtronic 
violated a federal requirement specific to the FDA’s PMA approval of 
this Class III device.”177 
Substantially the same result was reached in Horowitz v. Stryker 
Corp., in which the court found that the plaintiff failed to show that 
its manufacturing defect claims against the manufacturer of a hip 
prosthesis were based on a violation of a federal requirement.178  
“[P]laintiff’s ‘reliance on [defendants’ violations of] CGMP[] and 
QSR . . . does not save these claims from preemption . . . [as such 
requirements] are simply too generic, standing alone, to serve as 
the basis for [her] manufacturing-defect claim[].’”179  And, in 
Ilarraza v. Medtronic, Inc., the plaintiff’s state-law negligence per se 
claim against the manufacturer of an implantable pain medication 
pump, based on the manufacturer’s failure to manufacture the 
 
 172.  Id. at 1207. 
 173.  See id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Sprint Fidelis Leads I, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 (citation omitted). 
 176.  Id. at 1158. 
 177.  Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d at 1207 (emphasis added). 
 178.  613 F. Supp. 2d 271, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 179.  Id. at 284 (alteration in original) (quoting Sprint Fidelis Leads I, 592 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1157). 
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/2
  
1058 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:4 
pump in accordance with CGMP, was preempted because it was not 
based on violation of any specific federal requirement.180  The court 
concluded that the “intentionally vague and open-ended nature of 
the regulations relied upon is the precise reason why they cannot 
serve as the basis for a parallel claim.”181 
The intertwined questions of whether a plaintiff has 
established a parallel claim and whether the claim is properly 
pleaded were treated by the Eleventh Circuit in Wolicki-Gables v. 
Arrow International, Inc.182 in a fashion similar to the Eighth Circuit’s 
disposition of the claims in the Sprint Fidelis Leads II case.  Wolicki-
Gables alleged that she was injured by a defective pain medication 
pump system that had been implanted in her back to manage pain 
resulting from two back injuries.183  The federal district court 
dismissed her product liability and other claims after concluding 
that they were expressly preempted by the MDA.184  On appeal, the 
plaintiff argued that her state-law claims survived preemption 
because they were parallel claims.185 
The Eleventh Circuit said that plaintiffs must allege in their 
initial pleading186 facts that the manufacturer violated a particular 
federal requirement referring to the allegedly defective device187 
and concluded by saying that “‘[t]o properly allege parallel claims, 
the complaint must set forth facts’ pointing to specific PMA 
requirements that have been violated.”188  Because the plaintiff’s 
complaint did not set forth any specific failure to comply with any 
FDA regulation that could be linked to the injury, it thus failed to 
plead an un-preempted parallel claim.189 
In Deglemann v. Advanced Medical Optics,190 the Court of Appeals 
 
 180.  677 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 181.  Id. at 588. 
 182.  Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 183.  Id. at 1297–99. 
 184.  See Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (M.D. Fla. 
2009). 
 185.  Wolicki-Gables, 634 F.3d at 1300. 
 186.  Id. at 1301 (“Parallel claims must be specifically stated in the initial 
pleadings.”). 
 187.  Id.  (“A plaintiff must allege that ‘[the] defendant violated a particular 
federal specification referring to the device at issue.’”) (quoting Ilarraza v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
 188.  Id. (quoting Parker v. Stryker Corp., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (D. Colo. 
2008)). 
 189.  Id. at 1301–02. 
 190.  659 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated and dismissed per stipulation, 699 F.3d 
1103 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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for the Ninth Circuit concluded that FDA guidance documents for 
contact lens solutions created specific federal requirements 
sufficient to trigger preemption of claims brought by a putative 
class of consumers, based on California’s Unfair Competition Law 
and False Advertising Law, that they would not have bought the 
defendant’s contact lens disinfectant if they had known that it was 
not as effective as other solutions.191  The court said that “[t]he first 
step of our preemption analysis is deciding whether the FDA has 
promulgated a specific requirement that applies to contact lens 
solution.”192  Then, noting that the lens solution was a Class II 
device that came to market under section 510(k) of the MDA, the 
court nevertheless concluded that the “special controls” to which 
the defendant’s lens solution was subject “are federal requirements 
that apply to the testing, manufacture, and labeling of” such 
solutions.193  The FDA’s guidance document with which contact 
lens solution manufacturers must comply in order to be labeled a 
disinfecting solution requires such solutions to achieve a prescribed 
level of efficacy in killing five representative microorganisms.194  
The court concluded that the FDA had thus “promulgated specific 
requirements” for the defendant’s contact lens solution, and that 
the plaintiffs’ claims were expressly preempted because they would 
impose different requirements under the state law.195 
In all of these cases, the courts appear to insist on a federal-law 
requirement that is aimed quite specifically at the medical device 
alleged to have been the cause of the plaintiff’s harm.  In 
Deglemann, the FDA guidance document applied in exactly the 
same way to all contact lens cleaning solutions, but it imposed on 
all such solutions a specific performance requirement.196  Other 
circuits, however, have taken a more liberal view of the pleading 
requirements for successfully alleging a parallel state claim and 
avoiding summary dismissal of the complaint on preemption 
grounds.  The Seventh Circuit in Bausch v. Stryker Corp.,197 the Sixth 
 
 191.  Id. at 842. 
 192.  Id. at 841 (emphasis added). 
 193.  Id. at 841–42. 
 194.  Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PREMARKET NOTIFICATION (510(K)) GUIDANCE DOCUMENT 
FOR CONTACT LENS CARE PRODUCTS 89 (1997)). 
 195.  Id. at 842. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 498 (2011). 
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Circuit in Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics,198 and the Fifth Circuit in 
Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp.199 and in Bass v. Stryker Corp.,200 have 
all found plaintiffs’ pleadings to state parallel claims with sufficient 
adequacy to avoid dismissal, even where no device-specific federal 
requirement existed. 
In Bausch v. Stryker Corp., the Seventh Circuit was faced with the 
same issue decided by the Eighth Circuit in the Sprint Fidelis Leads II 
case.201  Margaret Bausch alleged that she had been injured by a hip 
prosthesis manufactured by the defendant that failed because it was 
“adulterated” and had to be replaced.202  The FDCA defines an 
“adulterated” device as one “not in conformity with applicable 
requirements or conditions.”203  Bausch alleged that the 
manufacturer failed to comply with federal standards established by 
the FDA’s CGMP.204  The trial court dismissed her complaint, 
holding that the claims were expressly preempted.205  On appeal, 
the court found the key issue to be whether 
the plaintiff must allege and prove a violation of a 
“concrete, device-specific” federal regulation.  The issue is 
important because manufacturers of Class III medical 
devices are required by federal law to comply with Quality 
System Regulations established by the FDA.  The Quality 
System Regulations also set forth Current Good 
Manufacturing Practices.206 
While the Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff must plead that a 
specific federal manufacturing practice applicable to defendant’s 
device had been violated,207 the Bausch court noted that the MDA 
expressly preempts any state-law requirement that is different from 
or in addition to “any [federal] requirement”208 applicable to the 
device and concluded that a plaintiff’s pleading is adequate if it 
 
 198.  382 F. App’x 436 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 199.  631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 200.  669 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 201.  Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 202.  Bausch, 630 F.3d at 549. . 
 203.  21 U.S.C. § 351(h) (2006). 
 204.  Bausch, 630 F.3d at 556. 
 205.  Bausch v. Stryker Corp., No. 08 C 4248, 2009 WL 2827954, at *4–5 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 31, 2009), rev’d, 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 498 
(2011). 
 206.  Bausch, 630 F.3d at 554. 
 207.  Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200, 1206 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 208.  630 F.3d at 555 (emphasis added). 
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simply alleges violation of the FDA’s CGMP and QSR.209  “[W]e do 
not see a sound legal basis for defendants’ proposal to distinguish 
between general requirements and ‘concrete, device-specific’ 
requirements.”210 
The Sixth Circuit has also rejected the idea that a federal 
requirement exists only if there is a device-specific requirement.  In 
Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant was negligent per se under Oklahoma law when it 
manufactured a knee implant that failed due to a manufacturing 
process that left lubricating oil residue on the implant in violation 
of the FDA’s CGMP.211  The court reversed the district court’s grant 
to the defendant of summary judgment on preemption grounds, 
concluding that the CGMP are “not so vague as to be incapable of 
enforcement.”212 
In Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp.,213 the Fifth Circuit 
considered a Mississippi state-law-based claim that the 
manufacturer of a medical device designed to treat excess uterine 
bleeding had negligently failed to warn about risks associated with 
the device, because Boston Scientific had failed to report earlier 
malfunctions of the device resulting in a “serious injury” as 
required by the FDA’s Medical Device Reporting (MDR) 
regulations.214  The pertinent regulations define “serious injury” as 
“an injury or illness that is life-threatening, results in permanent 
impairment of a body function or permanent damage to a body 
structure, or necessitates medical or surgical intervention to 
preclude permanent impairment of a body function or permanent 
damage to a body structure.”215  Boston Scientific had developed an 
“algorithm” for reporting that included the reporting of some, but 
not all, cases in which the device caused some kind of burn 
injury.216  The manufacturer later began to report more burn 
injuries, allegedly in response to a request or direction from the 
 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id.; see also Gelber v. Stryker Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 145, 159–160 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 211.  382 F. App’x 436, 438 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 212.  Id. at 440. 
 213.  631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 214.  Id. at 765–66; 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(1) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a) 
(2012). 
 215.  21 C.F.R. § 803.3; see 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(2). 
 216.  Under this algorithm, no first-degree and only some second-degree burn 
injuries were reported.  Hughes, 631 F.3d at 766. 
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FDA.217  The court concluded that, for purposes of resolving the 
summary judgment issue, the plaintiff had stated an un-preempted 
parallel claim when she alleged a state-law failure to warn claim 
predicated on the manufacturer’s failure to report serious injuries 
as required by FDA regulations: “A factfinder could infer that a 
manufacturer’s failure to provide this information as required by 
FDA regulations is a parallel violation of the state duty to provide 
reasonable and adequate information about a device’s risks.”218 
And in a more recent Fifth Circuit case, Bass v. Stryker Corp.,219 a 
plaintiff sued alleging that his hip replacement device, 
manufactured by the defendant, failed to attach properly to the 
bone due to manufacturing residuals on the device, requiring a 
second surgery.220  After the district court dismissed all of his claims 
on preemption grounds, Bass appealed, arguing that he had pled 
parallel state-law claims to the extent that the claims were based on 
manufacturing defects resulting from violations of FDA 
regulations.221  In particular, his pleadings alleged that Stryker 
initiated a recall of the device following an investigation in which 
the FDA found manufacturing residuals in excess of those 
permitted and that the device was therefore “adulterated” within 
the meaning of the relevant provision of the FDCA.222  The court 
noted that the plaintiff’s complaint “specifies with particularity 
what went wrong in the manufacturing process and cites the 
relevant FDA manufacturing standards Stryker allegedly 
violated.”223  The complaint also alleged that the FDA had 
determined that the device was “adulterated within the meaning of 
section 501(h) of the [FDCA].”224  The court said that 
[t]he key distinction between complaints that are 
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss and those that 
are not is not reliance on CGMP[], but rather the 
existence of a manufacturing defect caused by a violation 
of federal regulations and allegations connecting a defect 
in the manufacture of the specific device to that plaintiff’s 
 
 217.  See id. at 766–67. 
 218.  Id. at 770–71. 
 219.  669 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 220.  Id. at 506. 
 221.  Id. at 505–06. 
 222.  21 U.S.C. § 351(h) (2006); Bass, 669 F.3d at 510. 
 223.  Bass, 669 F.3d at 510 (quoting Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 782 
(2011)). 
 224.  Id. at 511 (citation omitted). 
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specific injury,”225 
and concluded by holding that “if a plaintiff pleads that a 
manufacturer of a Class III medical device failed to comply with 
either the specific processes and procedures that were approved by 
the FDA or the CGMP[] themselves and that this failure caused the 
injury, the plaintiff will have pleaded a parallel claim.”226 
A federal district court in the Fifth Circuit has taken an 
especially liberal view of whether there exists a federal requirement 
in a case in which a woman brought suit on behalf of her deceased 
husband who died when a critical part of his implanted heart assist 
pump system failed, causing the pump to fail and leading to a fatal 
cardiac arrest.227  In Bush v. Thoratec Corp.,228 the manufacturer’s 
device, a Left Ventricular Assist System (LVAS), had been 
implanted in Mr. Bush in 2008.229  The LVAS is a mechanical 
circulatory device used to partially replace the function of a failing 
heart by providing assistance to that part of the heart that pumps 
blood into the body’s circulatory system.230  The device was 
implanted at McGuire VA Medical Center, while Bush was living in 
Virginia.231  He returned to McGuire for inspection and monitoring 
of his implant for a few months, until he moved to New Orleans, 
where he then made monthly visits to Tulane Medical Center for 
the same monitoring.232  Shortly after Bush had received the 
implant, the manufacturer issued a press release and sent an 
Urgent Medical Device Correction letter to the hospitals that 
installed and monitored this device.233  That letter indicated that 
the manufacturer had become aware, over time, that the lead 
connecting the LVAS to its external controller could fail due to 
wear and fatigue, warned that the damage may or may not be 
visible to someone inspecting the lead, identified certain signs of 
damage, and advised hospitals to request their patients to return 
for inspection of the lead.234  Both McGuire and Tulane received 
 
 225.  Id. at 511–12. 
 226.  Id. at 512. 
 227.  Bush v. Thoratec Corp., No. 11–1654, 2012 WL 2513669 (E.D. La. June 
28, 2012). 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. at *1. 
 230.  See Ventricular Assist Devices, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org 
/ventricular-assist-devices (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
 231.  Bush, 2012 WL 2513669, at *1. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. 
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the letter, but neither notified Bush of the risk.235  Approximately a 
year-and-a-half after the warning letter was sent to the hospitals, 
Bush’s device failed, resulting in his death.236 
In her second amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant had violated an FDA regulation, which provides 
guidelines for product recall notices, and that the violation 
amounted to a failure to warn under state law.237 
The defendant-manufacturer argued that the federal 
regulation was too general to support a parallel state-law claim.238  
The regulation upon which Bush based her claim characterized the 
guidelines in the regulation as “[g]eneral.”239  Those guidelines say 
that the “format, content, and extent of a recall communication 
should be commensurate with the hazard of the product being 
recalled and the strategy developed for that recall” and describe 
the purposes of such recall notices “[i]n general terms.”240  The 
court said “[a]dmittedly” the guidelines provided by the regulation 
were “more general than the MDR reporting requirements 
allegedly violated in Hughes or the [C]GMP[] allegedly violated in 
Bass” (both cases in which the Fifth Circuit had rejected arguments 
that the relevant FDA regulations were too general), but it 
nevertheless denied the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss on 
preemption grounds.241  The court concluded that the plaintiff’s 
allegations were “sufficient . . . to survive a motion to dismiss.”242 
To call the regulation at issue in Bush “more general” than the 
one at issue in Hughes is a gross understatement.  As the Hughes 
court explained, the “plain text” of the reporting regulations at 
issue in that case required the device manufacturer to report “any 
time” the device “‘may have caused or contributed to death or 
serious injury,’ or malfunctioned in a manner that ‘would be likely 
to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury in [sic] the 
malfunction were to recur.’”243  Furthermore, the court pointed out 
that the term “serious injury” has a definition that is “mandated by 
 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. at *2. 
 238.  Id. at *2. 
 239.  21 C.F.R. § 7.49 (2012). 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Bush, 2012 WL 2513669, at *7, *9. 
 242.  Id. at *7. 
 243.  Hughes v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 773 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(1)(A)–(B)(2006)). 
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statute.”244 
A case like Bush raises a particular concern about whether 
there is a “requirement” in any meaningful sense of the term.  
Before a fact finder can decide whether a federal requirement has 
been violated, she must understand fairly precisely what conduct is 
required or prohibited by federal law, and then compare those 
requirements or prohibitions to the manufacturer’s conduct.  The 
federal regulation at issue in Bush is too general, admitting of more 
than one interpretation of the law’s requirements.  The parameters 
of the federal requirement are questions of law, the answers to 
which will not become more clear after discovery of more facts.  An 
allegation of a federal requirement of this level of generality should 
not be “sufficient for [a] Plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss.”245  
The result may be that a jury will eventually be left to determine the 
meaning, not just the application, of the law. 
This split among the circuits on the critical issue of just how 
specific the federal requirement allegedly violated must be may 
ultimately draw the Supreme Court’s attention and lead to review 
by that Court.  Some plaintiffs attempting to avoid dismissal on the 
pleadings, such as those in Sprint Fidelis Leads II, for example, have 
had trouble showing with sufficient specificity the existence of a 
federal requirement.  There, the Eighth Circuit required the 
plaintiffs’ pleadings to show that the defendant had “violated a 
federal requirement specific to the FDA’s PMA approval of this Class 
III device.”246  But other courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in Hughes, 
appear to give plaintiffs considerable latitude in pleading the 
existence of a federal requirement.  There the critical issue was 
whether an FDA reporting regulation that required the reporting 
of “serious” injuries caused by the device was, indeed, a federal 
requirement applicable to the defendant’s conduct.  That court 
concluded that a factfinder “could infer” that there was a federal 
requirement.247  But the factfinder should not be left to “infer” 
whether there is a federal requirement applicable to the device in 
issue; that is, whether federal law could be interpreted to apply.  
That question should be resolved by the court as a matter of law 
and then leave to the factfinder the task of determining whether 
 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Bush, 2012 WL 2513669, at *7. 
 246.  Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200, 1207 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasis 
added). 
 247.  Hughes, 631 F.3d at 770–71. 
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the requirement has or has not been satisfied.  It is the difference 
between deciding whether there is a legal requirement and 
whether that law has been violated. 
X. VIOLATION OF FEDERAL REQUIREMENT? 
Assuming that there is a federal requirement applicable to the 
device, genuine equivalency next requires that the plaintiff allege 
and prove that the device failed to comply with that federal 
requirement.  Assume, for example, that the manufacturer of a 
drug-coated stent, which has been approved so as to make it a 
“restricted device” under the FDCA,248 represents that the coating 
on the device does not increase the inflammatory response in 
coronary arteries into which the stent is implanted.  Also assume 
that this representation was not approved by the FDA nor is it part 
of the FDA-approved label for the device.  That representation 
would then make the device “misbranded,” and the introduction of 
the device into interstate commerce would be a violation of the 
FDCA.249  Another example, provided by the court in Bass, is to 
“suppose a manufacturer had represented to the FDA in its pre-
approval documentation that each hip implant component would 
be sterilized for ten minutes at 800 degrees.”250  Proof that the 
manufacturer instead sterilized the component at only 200 degrees 
for five minutes would then demonstrate the manufacturer’s 
violation of “what it told the FDA.”251 
On the other hand, an allegation that a device manufacturer 
was negligent because its implantable pain medication pump 
should have been labeled with warnings different from what the 
FDA required does not allege a violation of a federal requirement 
because the manufacturer cannot change the label without the 
FDA’s approval.252 
XI. STATE-LAW DUTY SAME AS DUTY IMPOSED UNDER FEDERAL LAW? 
Genuine equivalency also requires the plaintiff to show that 
the same conduct that violates the FDA requirement gives rise to a 
state-law cause of action that predates the federal requirement such 
 
 248.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)(1). 
 249.  Id. §§ 331, 352(q)(1). 
 250.  Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 512–13 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 251.  Id. at 513. 
 252.  See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 676 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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as negligence, strict liability, misrepresentation, or breach of 
warranty.253  For example, the same conduct that makes the drug-
coated stent misbranded under the FDCA could also give rise to an 
intentional or negligent misrepresentation claim under state 
common law or a state statute-based claim for false or misleading 
advertising. 
The part of the Lohr court’s opinion discussing parallel state-
law claims fell under the heading in the court’s opinion titled 
“Identity of Requirements Claims.”254  And, as the Riley court 
subsequently explained, in order for a state-law claim to be parallel 
and escape express preemption, it “must be premised on the 
breach of a state-law duty that is the same as a duty imposed under 
the FDCA.”255  The question then becomes: How is it determined 
whether the requirements of the state and federal-law claims are 
identical to or the “same as” one another? 
In Bausch v. Stryker Corp., the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant manufacturers marketed a hip prosthesis that was 
implanted in her body after the FDA had informed the defendants 
that a component of the device was “adulterated,” and that the 
implant failed, requiring surgical replacement of the device leading 
to a number of injuries.256  The court first noted that under Illinois 
law, “violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect human 
life or property [i]s prima facie evidence of negligence, though the 
violation may not always be conclusive on the issue of 
negligence.”257  Then, the court found that a manufacturer’s failure 
to comply with the FDA’s general CGMP regulations would make 
the device “adulterated” under federal law.258  Finally, the court 
concluded that the state-law negligence claim was parallel to the 
claim of a federal-law violation and thus not expressly preempted,259 
saying that 
[w]hile there may not be a “traditional state tort law” 
claim for an “adulterated” product in so many words, the 
federal definition of adulterated medical devices is tied 
directly to the duty of manufacturers to avoid foreseeable 
 
 253.  Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 254.  Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. 470, 494–97 (1996). 
 255.  Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (emphasis added). 
 256.  630 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 257.  Id. at 553. 
 258.  Id. at 555. 
 259.  See id. at 552 (“[W]here state law is parallel to federal law, section 360k 
does not preempt the claim.”). 
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dangers with their products by complying with federal law.  
The evidence showing a violation of federal law shows that 
the device is adulterated and goes a long way toward 
showing that the manufacturer breached a duty under 
state law toward the patient.260 
In Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., the court, discussing the 
plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant violated a state-law duty to 
warn “by failing to accurately report serious injuries and 
malfunctions of [its] device as required by the FDA’s . . . 
regulations,” could prove that allegation because “[a] factfinder 
could infer that a manufacturer’s failure to provide this 
information as required by FDA regulations is a parallel violation of 
the state duty to provide reasonable and adequate information 
about a device’s risks.”261 
XII.  APPLY “SAME ELEMENTS” TEST? 
The Bausch court clearly, and the Hughes court not as clearly, 
both suggest that the test for determining whether state- and 
federal-law claims are parallel is analogous to the Blockburger “same 
elements” test used by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine when 
two offenses are the “same” for double jeopardy purposes.262  Using 
this test would require a comparison of the state statute or common 
law cause of action with the federal statute or regulation.  When the 
elements are compared, if the state-law based-claim requires proof 
of an element different from those required to prove the federal-
law-based claim, then the state-law claim is not parallel.  An 
example of this test in application may be found in City of Baton 
Rouge v. Ross,263  a case in which a criminal defendant charged with 
violating a municipal ordinance that prohibited “drug traffic 
loitering” filed a motion to quash, alleging that the ordinance was 
expressly preempted by a Louisiana statute providing that no 
political subdivision of the state “shall enact an ordinance defining 
as an offense conduct that is defined and punishable as a felony 
under state law.”264  Importantly for purposes of this discussion of 
 
 260.  Id. at 557. 
 261.  631 F.3d 762, 770–71 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 262.  See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993); Blockburger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).  The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 263.  654 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1995). 
 264.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:143(A) (1995), quoted in Ross, 654 So. 2d at 
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constitutional preemption principles, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court first observed that in this case “the State’s interest is one of 
constitutional import, since the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 
expressly accords to the legislature, and not to local governments, 
the exclusive right to define felonies and to the district attorneys 
the exclusive right to prosecute them.”265  “More particularly, the 
Louisiana Constitution expressly provides that ‘[n]o local 
governmental subdivision shall . . . define and provide for the 
punishment of a felony.’”266 
When a municipality defines as a misdemeanor an offense 
that the legislature has designated a felony, and places a 
defendant in “jeopardy” for committing that offense so 
that the State cannot later retry the defendant, the 
municipality effectively prevents the State from inflicting 
upon the defendant the punishment the Legislature has 
decided is appropriate for the severity of that defendant’s 
conduct.267 
The court then applied the “same elements” test to answer the 
preemption question, saying that “it provides a straightforward 
method of determining whether, on its face, a municipal ordinance 
constitutes the ‘same offense’ as a state felony statute”268 and 
concluded that the local ordinance was expressly preempted by the 
state statute.269 
But a state-law claim may still be parallel even if it requires 
proof of additional elements beyond those required to prove a 
violation of federal law, or if the state-law claim would impose 
different remedies for the violation than those imposed by federal 
law.  For example, it may be necessary as a matter of state law to 
prove that violations of the FDCA amount to negligent conduct in 
order to demonstrate all of the elements of the state-law cause of 
action.  But in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the court explained that 
additional elements required to demonstrate a state-law cause of 
action 
would make the state requirements narrower, not 
broader, than the federal requirement.  While such a 
 
1313–15. 
 265.  Ross, 654 So. 2d at 1319 (citing LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9(A)(1); art. V, 
§ 26(B)). 
 266.  Id. (quoting LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9(A)(1)). 
 267.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 268.  Id. at 1324. 
 269.  Id. at 1325. 
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narrower requirement might be “different from” the 
federal rules in a literal sense, such a difference would 
surely provide a strange reason for finding pre-emption of 
a state rule insofar as it duplicates the federal rule.270 
Furthermore, the state- and federal-law remedies for the 
defendant’s violation271 need not be the same.  The Lohr court 
concluded that the express preemption provision of the MDA does 
not deny a state “the right to provide a traditional damages remedy 
for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel 
federal requirements.”272  Thus, for example, while the remedy for 
a federal-law violation may be an administrative penalty or some 
kind of equitable relief, the remedy for the state-law violation for 
the same conduct may be the imposition of a damages remedy, and 
the state-law claim will still be considered to be parallel to the 
federal-law claim.  This view of the meaning of a parallel claim was 
subsequently affirmed in Riegel when the court concluded that 
“§ 360k does not prevent a State from providing a damages remedy 
for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations; the state 
duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than add to, federal 
requirements.”273 
XIII.  THE SCOPE OF EXPRESS PREEMPTION 
In sum, if the state-law-based claim does not parallel a claim 
for violation of the federal requirements, it is expressly preempted 
by the MDA.  To determine whether a state law claim is preempted 
because it is different from or in addition to federal law or simply 
parallels federal law, one must (1) look at the defendant’s conduct 
that gives rise to the plaintiff’s right to recover under state law, and 
(2) determine whether that conduct is prohibited by the FDCA.  If 
it is not, the claim is expressly preempted by § 360k(a).  The courts 
differ in their views of the precise scope of express preemption, 
some holding the view that federal law is broadly preemptive 
because surviving state-law claims must parallel narrow device-
 
 270.  518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996). 
 271.  I use the term “violation” loosely here to include the breach of a state 
common law duty. 
 272.  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495.  “The presence of a damages remedy does not 
amount to the additional or different ‘requirement’ that is necessary under the 
statute; rather, it merely provides another reason for manufacturers to comply 
with identical existing ‘requirements’ under federal law.” Id. 
 273.  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008); see also Hughes v. 
Bos. Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 775 (5th Cir. 2011). 
37
Prince: The Puzzle of Parallel Claims, Preemption, and Pleading the Parti
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
2013] PUZZLE OF PARALLEL CLAIMS 1071 
specific federal requirements, while others maintain that state-law 
claims need only parallel broader generally-applicable federal 
requirements to remain un-preempted.  This scope-of-express-
preemption question will ultimately have to be resolved by the 
Supreme Court. 
However, even if not expressly preempted, the state-law claim 
may be impliedly preempted under Buckman.  It is to that question 
that we now turn. 
XIV.  WHICH PARALLEL CLAIMS ARE IMPLIEDLY PREEMPTED? 
As noted earlier, the Buckman court drew a distinction between 
the claim for fraud against the federal agency and the state-law 
causes of action raised in Lohr, including the claim for failure to 
warn of pacemaker lead failures despite knowledge of earlier 
failures, noting that Lohr “can be read to allow certain state-law 
causes of action that parallel federal safety requirements.”274 
In Lohr, the plaintiffs’ claims were based upon traditional state-
law tort theories of negligence and strict liability.275  But in 
Buckman, by way of contrast, the plaintiffs were bringing a claim 
based upon, and that existed solely because of, the FDCA.  That 
distinction was important to the outcome in which the court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “any violation of the FDCA 
will support a state-law claim.”276  It is thus clear that some state-law 
claims based on an FDCA violation are impliedly preempted but 
also clear that some FDCA violations will support an un-preempted 
parallel state-law claim.  The court did not consider whether 
parallel state-law claims not based on fraud, but based on 
negligence or strict liability, or some other theory of liability, might 
also be impliedly preempted.  Therefore the scope of Buckman is 
far from clear, and the court has not subsequently made clear 
which state-law claims involving federal-law violations interfere with 
the FDA’s regulatory and enforcement authority, and are therefore 
impliedly preempted, and which are not. 
After Buckman, some commentators suggested that the 
Supreme Court’s implied preemption analysis could be extended 
beyond fraud-on-the-FDA claims to preclude other common law 
 
 274.  Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001). 
 275.  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 481. 
 276.  Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353. 
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claims.277  Several courts have indeed read Buckman broadly to 
mean that any private action that incorporates a violation of an 
FDA regulation is impliedly preempted. 
An early example of an expansive interpretation of Buckman is 
Flynn v. American Home Products Corp., a case in which the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals applied Buckman to hold that a plaintiff’s 
common-law-fraud and consumer-fraud claims, based on fraud-on-
the-FDA, were “preempted by federal law and are not actionable in 
Minnesota.”278  The plaintiff, who had taken a generic version of 
the prescription diet drug combination known as “fen-phen,” sued 
the manufacturer of a brand-name version of one of the drug’s 
components, fenfluramine.279  Although the plaintiff had never 
consumed the defendant’s product, she alleged that the defendant 
violated FDA requirements by failing to report information 
regarding known adverse health events associated with the drug 
and instead misrepresented to the FDA that the drug was safe.280  As 
a result, she claimed, physicians began prescribing the drug as part 
of the fen-phen combination, and her doctor, without knowing the 
risks, prescribed her the generic fen-phen version.281 
The court dismissed her common-law and consumer-fraud 
claims on preemption grounds, noting that, as in Buckman, the 
FDA had the authority to police the regulatory violations that 
formed the bases of the plaintiff’s claims.282  Not only would the 
existence of state-law-misrepresentation and consumer-fraud claims 
conflict with the FDA’s authority to consistently police such 
violations within its regulatory powers, but also, “50 state-law causes 
of action for violation of the FDA’s detailed regulations would 
increase the burdens placed on applicants for FDA approval.”283 
 
 277.  See, e.g., Rebecca Porter, Supreme Court Rules that Suit for Fraud on Federal 
Agency Is Preempted, TRIAL, Apr. 2001, at 17, 82 (“[Buckman] ‘could leave consumers 
out in the cold without any remedy.’”) (quoting Jeffrey White, Associate General 
Counsel for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America); Raymond M. Williams & 
Anita Jain, Preemption of State “Fraud-on-the-FDA” Claims, FOR DEF., June 2001, at 23–
25, 50 (“[The] FDA’s regulatory scheme is arguably just as endangered when 
liability is imposed due to a state law failure to warn or design defect claim as it is 
when liability is imposed for a fraud-on-the-FDA claim.”). 
 278.  Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001). 
 279.  Id. at 345. 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  Id. at 349.  
 283.  Id. (citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 
(2001)). 
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More recently, in Lewkut v. Stryker Corp.,284 the plaintiff alleged 
that his hip implant was defective and sued the manufacturer 
claiming relief under Texas law for negligence, strict liability, and 
that state’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act.285  According to the 
complaint, manufacturing residues coating part of the implant 
prevented it from being securely held into the hip socket.286  To the 
extent that these state-law claims paralleled federal requirements 
prohibiting “adulterated devices,” the federal district court ruled 
that they were impliedly preempted because such federal violations 
“are to be enforced through the United States government only.”287  
Similarly, in Wheeler v. DePuy Spine, Inc.,288 the court concluded that 
a plaintiff’s claim that it was negligent under Florida law for the 
manufacturer of an artificial spinal disc to not accurately disclose to 
the FDA the number of complications associated with the implant’s 
use of which the manufacturer was aware, appeared to be an 
impliedly preempted claim for noncompliance with MDA 
provisions: “The FDCA ‘leaves no doubt’ that it is the Federal 
Government and not private litigants who are authorized to sue for 
noncompliance with the medical device provisions.”289  And in Riley 
v. Cordis, the plaintiff was implanted with a stent manufactured by 
the defendant.290  After he later suffered a heart attack, due to a 
blood clot that had formed at the site of his stent, he brought 
numerous claims against the stent manufacturer including a claim 
that Cordis was promoting the off-label use of the stent in a 
manner not authorized by the FDCA.291  The court ruled that such 
a claim was impliedly preempted.  It is not private parties but “the 
FDA [that] is charged with the difficult task of regulating the 
marketing . . . of medical devices.”292 
Plaintiffs suing device manufacturers for injuries allegedly 
caused by a device commonly assert a negligence per se count in 
their pleadings, arguing that a violation of federal regulations 
demonstrates negligence under state common law.  They argue 
that the negligence per se claim thus does not impose any 
 
 284.  724 F. Supp. 2d 648 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 285.  Id. at 651. 
 286.  Id. at 659. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  706 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 289.  Id. at 1269 n.4. 
 290.  625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 291.  Id. at 783. 
 292.  Id. at 778. 
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requirement on a device manufacturer that is different from or in 
addition to federal requirements.  Nevertheless, some courts have 
found these claims to be impliedly preempted.293  For example, in 
McClelland v. Medtronic, Inc., a decedent’s estate sued for the 
decedent’s death, arguing that it was caused by a defective pulse 
generator, a critical part of a pacemaker manufactured by the 
defendant.294  The plaintiff sued in Florida state court, alleging 
negligence per se as part of its complaint.295  Medtronic removed 
the case to federal court and argued that the negligence per se 
claim should be dismissed because Florida law does not recognize a 
cause of action for violations of the FDCA or its implementing 
regulations.296  The court agreed, saying that “under Florida law, 
the violation of a statute can only give rise to civil liability if the 
statute indicates an intention to create a private cause of action.”297  
Noting that “[t]he FDCA expressly provides that all actions to 
enforce the Act ‘shall be by and in the name of the United States,’” 
the court concluded that “[t]his language evidences legislative 
intent to prohibit a private right of action for a violation of the 
FDCA.  Therefore, Plaintiff cannot assert a negligence per se claim 
based on violations of the FDCA or the FDA’s implementing 
regulations.”298  In other words, the court concluded that the 
negligence per se count of the plaintiff’s complaint should be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim under state law, and the reason 
that it failed to state a claim was that the FDCA does not indicate an 
intention to create a private cause of action.  Indeed, to the 
contrary, that statute indicates Congress’s intent that enforcement 
of those FDA regulations is the exclusive province of the FDA. 
But while some courts have found the scope of Buckman 
preemption to be quite broad, others have limited its holding solely 
 
 293.  But several courts have ruled that such claims are not preempted.  See 
infra, text accompanying notes 317–335. 
 294.  No. 6:11–CV–1444–Orl–36KRS, 2012 WL 5077401 (M.D. Fla., Sept. 27, 
2012). 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  Id. at *2, *4. 
 297.  Id. at *5 (citing Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985–86 (Fla. 
1994)). 
 298.  Id.  But many states have held that a state-law negligence per se claim can 
be based on violation of FDA regulations.  See, e.g., Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig 
Div. Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 932–33 (5th Cir. 2006); Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., 
Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 563–64 (3d Cir. 1983); Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 
727, 733 (2d Cir. 1979); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 461 (4th 
Cir. 1960); Valente v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 48 F. Supp. 2d 862, 876 (E.D. Wis. 1999). 
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to fraud-on-the-FDA claims. 
In Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc.,299 a panel of the Ninth Circuit ruled 
that certain parallel state-law claims of negligence were impliedly 
preempted.300  The plaintiff in this case alleged that he was 
rendered paraplegic as a result of an inflammation that had 
developed in his spine at the site of a catheter that was part of an 
implanted pain medication pump manufactured by Medtronic.301  
In a proposed amended complaint, Stengel alleged that under 
federal law and regulation Medtronic “was under a continuing duty 
to monitor the product after premarket approval and to discover 
and report to the FDA any complaints about the product’s 
performance and any adverse health consequences of which it 
became aware and that are or may be attributable to the 
product.”302  The court noted that, to whatever extent the alleged 
violations of FDA regulations are actionable under state law, they 
“parallel the federal requirements, and thus are not expressly 
preempted.”303  But, the court explained, the Stengels’ theory that 
survived express preemption was that if Medtronic had acted with 
reasonable care in complying with the regulations that required it 
to provide information to the FDA, the agency would have required 
the manufacturer to warn physicians about the risk, and Stengel 
could have avoided the injury caused by the pump.304  In effect, the 
plaintiffs were alleging that “the defendant . . . misinformed the 
FDA tacitly by failing to report information that it had a duty to 
report.”305  Relying on Buckman, the court ruled that this claim was 
impliedly preempted.306  “There is no meaningful distinction 
between the Stengels’ failure-to-warn claims and the fraud-on-the-
FDA claims held to be preempted in Buckman.”307  This conclusion 
is consistent with that of the Eighth Circuit in Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 
in which the court described plaintiff’s allegations that “Medtronic 
failed to provide the FDA with sufficient information and did not 
timely file adverse event reports, as required by federal regulations” 
 
 299.  676 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
 300.  See id. at 1163. 
 301.  Id. at 1161. 
 302.  Id. at 1163 (quoting Plaintiff’s Substitute Amended Complaint). 
 303.  Id. 
 304.  Id. at 1164. 
 305.  Id. 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  Id. 
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as “simply an attempt by private parties to enforce the MDA, claims 
foreclosed by § 337(a) as construed in Buckman.”308 
However, after granting a rehearing en banc, the full court 
reversed the panel decision and concluded that this “continuing 
duty to monitor . . . and report to the FDA” claim was not impliedly 
preempted.309  Describing the plaintiffs’ proposed new state-law 
claim in their amended complaint as “specifically . . . a failure to 
warn the FDA,” the court concluded that “[i]t is a state-law claim 
that is independent of the FDA’s pre-market approval process that 
was at issue in Buckman.” and thus not impliedly preempted.310 
In reaching its conclusion that the state-law claim is 
“independent of” federal requirements for the device,311 the court 
reviewed Buckman and said that the plaintiffs’ claims there were 
“wholly federal”;312 that they “alleged no state-law claim and were 
concerned exclusively with alleged fraud on the FDA.”313  But this is 
obviously not literally correct.  The Buckman plaintiffs did allege 
state-law claims, alleging that the defendant had committed fraud 
when it made certain statements to the FDA in the course of 
obtaining approval for the device at issue in that case.314  If no state-
law claims had been alleged in Buckman, the preemption issue 
upon which the outcome in the case turned would not have arisen.  
In describing the preempted state-law claims in Buckman as “wholly 
federal,” perhaps the Stengel court meant that the alleged 
wrongdoing in that case arose entirely out of the defendant’s 
dealings with the FDA.315  Similarly, the Stengels’ failure-to-warn 
claim arose entirely out of Medtronics’ dealings with, or failure to 
deal with by reporting to, the FDA.  The court’s explanation thus 
fails to distinguish the Stengels’ claims from the preempted claims 
in Buckman.  However, even if the court’s reasoning in Stengel is 
obscure, the result clearly stands for the proposition that state-law 
claims are not impliedly preempted unless they are specifically a 
 
 308.  Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200, 1205–06 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 309.  Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1232 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 310.  Id. at 1233. 
 311.  Id. 
 312.  Id. at 1230. 
 313.  Id. at 1230. 
 314.  Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 345–46 (2001) 
(“Many of these actions include state-law causes of action claiming that petitioner 
and AcroMed made fraudulent representations to the FDA . . . .”). 
 315.  See 531 U.S. 341 at 347–48 (“Here, petitioner’s dealings with the FDA 
were prompted by the MDA, and the very subject matter of petitioner’s statements 
were dictated by that statute’s provisions.”). 
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fraud-on-the-FDA claim, a result and reasoning very much in line 
with that of the Fifth Circuit in Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp.316 
In Globetti v. Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corp., a prescription drug 
case, a federal district court rejected the defendant’s argument that 
the plaintiff’s claims all involved communications with the FDA 
and, therefore, were preempted under Buckman.317  The court 
concluded that Buckman was limited to fraud-on-the-FDA claims 
alleging “that the federal agency was itself the victim of the fraud” 
and did not preclude common law claims for misrepresentation 
and failure to warn.318  As the court explained, “[a]lthough 
Buckman precludes a plaintiff from seeking damages because the 
defendant lied to the FDA, it is something completely different to 
contend that plaintiff is precluded from seeking damages for 
injuries due to lies to her.”319  Those alleged injuries arose from 
duties owed to the plaintiff, not the FDA, which existed separate 
and apart from the requirements of the MDA.320  Thus, the court 
concluded, the plaintiff could not recover simply because the 
defendant may have made misrepresentations to the FDA, but she 
could recover for misrepresentations directed to her or her 
physician.321 
Just as in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Stengel,322 the Seventh 
Circuit in Bausch and the Fifth Circuit in Hughes have interpreted 
the preemptive effect of Buckman to be limited strictly to fraud-on-
the-FDA claims, and have found plaintiffs’ state-law claims to be 
traditional tort claims that are “not analogous”323 to a claim of fraud 
on the agency such as those in Buckman and, thus, not impliedly 
preempted. 
In Bausch, the plaintiff alleged that the injury-causing device 
was “adulterated” under federal law and that this violation of 
federal law was prima facie evidence of negligence.324  “Illinois 
 
 316.  631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 317.  Globetti v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. CV98-TMP-2649-S, 2001 WL 
419160, at *1–2 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 5, 2001). 
 318.  Id. at *1. 
 319.  Id.; see also Dawson ex rel. Thompson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., USA, 145 F. 
Supp. 2d 565, 573 (D. N.J. 2001) (concluding that Buckman did not apply to 
plaintiff’s common-law fraud claims, which did not allege fraud on the FDA, but 
fraud on the public). 
 320.  Globetti, 2001 WL 419160, at *1. 
 321.  Id. at *3. 
 322.  Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 323.  See Hughes v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 775–76 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 324.  Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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treats a violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect 
human life or property as prima facie evidence of negligence, 
though the violation may not always be conclusive on the issue of 
negligence.”325  But the court rejected the defendant’s assertion 
that such a claim was impliedly preempted because it was effectively 
an effort to enforce federal law, saying that 
[w]hile there may not be a “traditional state tort law” 
claim for an “adulterated” product in so many words, the 
federal definition of adulterated medical devices is tied 
directly to the [state-law] duty of manufacturers to avoid 
foreseeable dangers with their products by complying with 
federal law.  The evidence showing a violation of federal 
law shows that the device is adulterated and goes a long 
way toward showing that the manufacturer breached a 
duty under state law toward the patient.326 
In Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp.,327 the plaintiff sued the 
manufacturer of a medical device intended for the treatment of 
excess uterine bleeding, alleging, inter alia, that the manufacturer 
was negligent per se for violating the FDA safety reporting 
regulations applicable to the device.328  Explaining that 
“[n]egligence per se is a legal theory that assists a party to prove 
that his adversary was negligent,” the court concluded that the 
plaintiff was “not foreclosed by § 360k from arguing . . . that the 
doctrine of negligence per se is available to assist her in proving 
her claim.”329  The court rejected the notion that the plaintiff’s 
claim was an attempt to exercise the enforcement authority granted 
exclusively to the FDA and was therefore impliedly preempted.330  
The court said that the negligence claim was “not analogous” to 
Buckman’s fraud-on-the-FDA theory.331 
The plaintiffs in Buckman were attempting to assert a 
freestanding federal cause of action based on violation of 
the FDA’s regulations; the plaintiffs did not assert 
violation of a state tort duty.  In contrast, Hughes is 
 
 325.  Id. at 553. 
 326.  Id. at 557. 
 327.  631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011).  The court relied in part on its pre-Riegel 
decision, Gomez v. St. Jude Medical Daig Division, Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 933 (5th Cir. 
2006), in which it held that negligent manufacturing claims based on violations of 
FDA requirements were not impliedly preempted. 
 328.  Id. at 765. 
 329.  Id. at 771. 
 330.  Id. at 775–76. 
 331.  Id. at 775. 
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asserting a Mississippi tort claim based on the underlying 
state duty to warn about the dangers or risks of [a] 
product, 
a claim that can be proven by showing a violation of the 
federal regulations.332 
Some courts thus find the scope of implied preemption to be 
limited to situations strongly analogous to that which gave rise to 
Buckman itself, that is, claims that are “wholly federal”333 or “a 
freestanding federal cause of action.”334  But as long as some 
“traditional state tort law”335 claim is alleged, even if the conduct 
that would allow the plaintiff to prevail under that state-law claim 
amounts to fraud-on-the-FDA, that is sufficient to avoid dismissal of 
the claim.  However, other courts have interpreted the Buckman 
holding more expansively to include preemption of state-law claims 
that, at bottom, “would not exist if the FDCA did not exist”336 such 
as a negligence per se claim in which the allegedly negligent 
conduct is conduct that violates a requirement established by 
federal law. 
XV.  THE SCOPE OF IMPLIED PREEMPTION 
To the extent that parallel state-law claims incorporate the 
same elements as must be shown to demonstrate a violation of 
federal law, they either are effectively negligence per se claims or 
strongly analogous to a negligence per se claim.  Negligence per se 
is a doctrine that allows for the incorporation of a statutory or 
regulatory requirement as the standard of conduct for non-
negligent behavior.337  But use of this doctrine does not convert a 
state-law cause of action for negligence into a private federal-law 
cause of action.338  On the other hand, a federal statute may 
 
 332.  Id. 
 333.  See supra note 315 and accompanying text. 
 334.  See supra note 332 and accompanying text. 
 335.  Bausch v. Stryker, 630 F.3d 546, 557 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 336.  Riley v. Cordis, 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 337.  See David G. Owen, Proving Negligence in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 
36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1005–06 (2004) (“In such situations, a court borrows the 
specific standard of conduct set forth in the statute, deferring to the legislative 
determination of proper behavior, in substitution for the general definition of due 
care.”). 
 338.  See Lowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The 
mere fact that the law which evidences negligence is Federal while the negligence 
action itself is brought under State common law does not mean that the state law 
claim metamorphoses into a private right of action under Federal regulatory 
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expressly339 or impliedly340 provide a private right of action—that is, 
a right enforceable by private parties that is created by federal law.  
Whether a federal-law cause of action exists by implication is 
determined by looking at congressional intent.  Negligence per se 
and implied cause of action are, therefore, different doctrines, and 
this difference suggests a useful analytical basis for distinguishing 
between those parallel state-law claims that are impliedly 
preempted and those that are not. 
One can certainly argue, from the exclusive-federal-
enforcement language of the FDCA itself341 and from the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Buckman, that the only state-law claims impliedly 
preempted are those that amount to a claim of an implied federal 
cause of action to enforce a federal requirement arising from the 
FDCA.  However, Buckman is far from clear and some of the policy 
arguments favoring preemption of the plaintiffs’ claims in that case 
are equally applicable to some state-law claims that preexisted the 
FDCA but have some of the same effects on the FDA’s enforcement 
discretion and resources.  For example, a plaintiff might allege that 
it is negligence per se under state law to fail to report to the FDA 
certain information about the safety of a medical device after it has 
been approved for use.342  The success of the plaintiff’s state-law 
claim relies on demonstrating that the defendant has violated FDA 
reporting requirements and may result in the imposition of money 
damages if the negligence per se claim succeeds.  Yet the FDA may 
simultaneously choose not to pursue the device manufacturer for 
those same reporting violations based on a judgment that the 
violations resulted from the manufacturer’s mistaken-in-good-faith 
interpretations of the requirements, or that it would be 
inconsistent with past agency applications or enforcement of the 
regulations, or that it would be inappropriate to impose civil 
 
law.”). 
 339.  See, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006), the citizen suit provision of 
the Clean Air Act, providing that “any person may commence a civil action in his 
own behalf” against any person, including governmental entities, for violations of 
the act. 
 340.  See Swanson v. Emerson Elec. Co., 374 N.W.2d 690, 705 (Minn. 1985) 
(allowing private claim for violation of Consumer Product Safety Commission’s 
product hazard reporting regulations). 
 341.  21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2006); see Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., v. Thompson, 
478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986) (“Congress has determined that there should be no 
private, federal cause of action for the violation [of the FDCA].”). 
 342.  See, for example, Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 764 (5th 
Cir. 2011), in which the court found such a claim not to be impliedly preempted. 
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penalties or other sanctions for the violation.  Allowing the state-
law claim to proceed could skew the FDA’s efforts “to achieve a 
somewhat delicate balance of statutory objectives” and interfere 
with the flexibility granted by federal law to the agency that “is a 
critical component of the statutory and regulatory framework 
under which the FDA pursues difficult (and often competing) 
objectives”—two of the concerns that led the Buckman court to 
conclude that the claims brought by plaintiffs in that case 
sufficiently conflicted with federal objectives so that they were 
impliedly preempted.343 
The Supreme Court will ultimately have to attempt to more 
clearly resolve the scope of Buckman implied preemption. 
XVI.  PLAINTIFFS’ PLEADING PROBLEMS 
Plaintiffs’ success in these suits has depended in large part on 
two factors.  The first is whether they have been able to gain access 
to documents or other information regarding the premarket 
approval process and subsequent data before a dismissal on 
preemption grounds cuts off any further discovery.  And the 
second is whether their pleading of a parallel state claim is made 
with sufficient specificity to satisfy the enhanced pleading 
requirements engendered by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly344 and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.345  The adequacy-of-pleading issue arises typically 
when the defendant files a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)346 for failure to state a claim.  In federal 
courts, this rule must be interpreted in conjunction with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) which sets out the requirements for 
pleading a claim for relief and calls for “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”347  To 
avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere 
conclusory allegations, that are sufficient to “‘nudge[] [his] 
claims’ . . . ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”348  This 
means pleading “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face” and “raise a right to relief above the 
 
 343.  See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348–49 (2001). 
 344.  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 345.  556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 346.  Or an equivalent state rule of procedure. 
 347.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 348.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
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speculative level.”349  It appears that these pleading requirements 
may have had some, though not a dramatic, impact on the 
outcomes of medical device litigation.350  These factors are related, 
of course, because the level of specificity possible at the pleading 
stage turns in no small part on the amount of discovery that has 
been available up to the time that the court rules on the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss on preemption grounds. 
One problem in these cases for plaintiffs is trying to plead 
their claims in a way that avoids preemption and dismissal on the 
pleadings for that reason.351  The cases show that it is very typical for 
the plaintiff to already have amended their original complaint by 
the time the court addresses the preemption issue raised by the 
defense.352  Amendment or further amendment is not always 
allowed, especially if the court thinks that even the amended 
pleadings would still allege preempted claims so that amendment 
would be futile.353  Even when plaintiffs have had the opportunity to 
 
 349.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).  In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the 
Supreme Court rejected an argument that its earlier decision in Twombly should be 
limited to pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute, such as that 
which gave rise to Twombly: “This argument is not supported by Twombly and is 
incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Though Twombly 
determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was 
based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8.  That Rule in turn governs 
the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States 
district courts.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (citations omitted).   
 350.  See, e.g., William M. Janssen, Iqbal “Plausibility” in Pharmaceutical and 
Medical Device Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541, 645 (2011) (some minor effect); 
Colleen McNamara, note, Iqbal as Judicial Rorschach Test: An Empirical Study of 
District Court Interpretations of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 401, 433–34 
(2011). 
 351.  If the claim pleaded is preempted, it would ordinarily be dismissed 
because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  See, e.g., FED. R. 
CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 352.  See, e.g., Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 779 (5th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff 
had amended complaint once and sought leave to file second amended 
complaint, a motion denied by trial court); Hughes v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 631 
F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff filed amended complaint after defendant’s 
removal of case to federal district court); Gelber v. Stryker Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 
145, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (court had previously granted defendant’s motion to 
dismiss with leave to amend; plaintiff filed amended complaint); Plaintiff’s First 
Amended Complaint, Bass v. Stryker Corp., No. 4:09–CV–632–Y, 2010 WL 3431637 
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2010), 2009 WL 6354479.  
 353.  See, e.g., Gross v. Stryker Corp., 858 F. Supp. 2d 466, 505 (W.D. Pa. 2012) 
(“In this Court’s estimation, leave to amend is not required because any 
amendment of Plaintiff’s Complaint would be futile.  Plaintiff’s strict liability 
claims against [Defendant] are not viable under Pennsylvania law.  He has not set 
forth any facts supporting a breach of express warranty claim.  Finally, his 
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amend their pleadings, that is sometimes not enough to save the 
case from dismissal.354 
Another problem for plaintiffs arises when their allegations are 
challenged as lacking the specificity necessary to avoid dismissal 
under the enhanced pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal.  
A plaintiff may try to avoid dismissal by arguing that he does not 
have enough information to be any more specific and needs 
discovery to develop that information.355  The courts vary in their 
 
remaining claims are expressly preempted, do not meet the narrow exception of 
parallel claims, or are conceded.  For these reasons, the Court declines to grant 
Plaintiff the opportunity to amend.”); Reeves v. PharmaJet, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 
791, 798–99 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (“Moreover, the Court finds that granting a motion 
to amend the Complaint would be futile in this instance because the essence of 
Plaintiff’s current claim is an alleged violation of the FDCA for which there is no 
private cause of action.  Moreover, the new potential claims suggested by Plaintiff 
involving negligent misrepresentation or fraud would fail for the same reason and 
there is also the problem that Plaintiff did not and cannot allege that [Defendant] 
made any misrepresentations to the Plaintiff, thus preventing the establishment of 
either potential new claim.”).  But see Leonard v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 1:10–CV–
03787–JEC, 2011 WL 3652311, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2011) (“Plaintiffs make 
several new factual allegations in their response related to Leonard’s injuries and 
death which are not in the original complaint.  These allegations relate to 
plaintiffs’ ability to state a valid claim for relief and to the timeliness issue.  
Further, the complaint was filed several months before the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Wolicki-Gables, which set the parameters for a valid parallel claim under 
Riegel.  In the interests of justice, the Court will grant plaintiffs leave to amend 
their complaint.”). 
 354.  See, e.g., Funk, 631 F.3d at 779 (plaintiff amended complaint once, sought 
leave to file second amended complaint but motion denied by trial court; dismissal 
based on first amended complaint affirmed on appeal); Loreto v. Procter & 
Gamble Co., 737 F. Supp. 2d 909, 924 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (“Because Plaintiffs had 
the opportunity to amend their Complaints after having notice of [defendant]’s 
position, and because such amendment failed to cure any pleading deficiencies, 
another amendment is not warranted.”).  But see Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 
501, 510 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Bass has sufficiently pleaded parallel claims in his first 
amended complaint, to the extent that the claims are based upon manufacturing 
defects resulting from violations of federal regulations.”). 
 355.  See, e.g., Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200, 1206–07 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(“On appeal, Plaintiffs primarily argue that the district court’s application of 
Twombly in this case held them to an impossible pleading standard because the 
FDA’s specific federal manufacturing requirements are set forth in the agency’s 
PMA approval files that are accessible, without discovery, only to Medtronic and to 
the FDA.  This argument—which focuses on the timing of the preemption 
ruling—would have considerable force in a case where a specific defective Class III 
device injured a consumer, and the plaintiff did not have access to the specific 
federal requirements in the PMA prior to commencing the lawsuit.  Compare 
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th Cir. 2009) (while plaintiffs 
‘must offer sufficient factual allegations to show that he or she is not merely 
engaged in a fishing expedition or strike suit, we must also take account of their 
limited access to crucial information.’)” (footnote omitted)). 
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reactions.  Some deny the plaintiff’s motion to allow more 
discovery, concluding that it would not alter the eventual 
outcome.356  Others allow the plaintiff to conduct discovery—in 
practice, that alone increases the plaintiff’s settlement leverage—so 
that they may obtain (assuming it is there to discover) the further 
information needed for a detailed statement of the specific bases 
for the claim.357 
If discovery is unlikely to provide the information necessary to 
make a plaintiff’s allegations more specific, then there is not an 
adequate reason to allow the plaintiff to proceed any further.  But 
courts should deny a motion to dismiss on the pleadings and allow 
for at least some discovery if the information necessary to craft 
pleadings with sufficient specificity is otherwise beyond the reach of 
the plaintiff and likely to be discovered.  The preemption issue can 
then be decided in the context of a motion for summary judgment. 
XVII.  CONCLUSION 
The precise contours of the narrow gap through which a 
plaintiff bringing a product defect claim against a medical device 
manufacturer must sail in order to avoid having her claims 
preempted are not yet clear.  The plaintiff’s state-law claims must 
not impose on the manufacturer requirements that are different 
from, or in addition to, those imposed by the FDCA and its 
 
 356.  See, e.g., Gross, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 503 (“No discovery is necessary here 
because, even after discovery, Plaintiff would still not be able to allege any viable 
claims against Stryker.  In fact, numerous district courts across the country have 
dismissed very similar actions in their entirety at the motion to dismiss stage.”); 
Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., No. CV 10–318–TUC–RCC, 2010 WL 4483970, at *3 (D. 
Ariz. Nov. 9, 2010), aff’d, 676 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]dditional discovery is 
futile because Plaintiff’s claims are preempted and additional discovery will not 
remedy that.”). 
 357.  See, e.g., Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(District court’s refusal to allow amendment of pleadings reversed as abuse of 
discretion: “In applying that standard to claims for defective manufacture of a 
medical device in violation of federal law, moreover, district courts must keep in 
mind that much of the product-specific information about manufacturing needed 
to investigate such a claim fully is kept confidential by federal law.  Formal 
discovery is necessary before a plaintiff can fairly be expected to provide a detailed 
statement of the specific bases for her claim.”); Warren v. Howmedica Osteonics 
Corp., No. 4:10 CV 1346 DDN, 2010 WL 5093097, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2010) 
(“[P]laintiffs are entitled to proceed with their suit and obtain information 
through discovery.”); Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F. Supp. 2d 830, 
838 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (“With discovery, [plaintiff] may or may not be able to prove 
[his] claims . . . .”). 
51
Prince: The Puzzle of Parallel Claims, Preemption, and Pleading the Parti
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
2013] PUZZLE OF PARALLEL CLAIMS 1085 
implementing regulations, or the claim is expressly preempted by 
the MDA.  Instead, the requirements that state law imposes on the 
manufacturer must simply parallel the requirements imposed by 
federal law.  There are two key issues to be resolved in the express 
preemption cases.  The first is just how specific the applicable 
federal law must be in order to be regarded as a requirement of 
federal law.  The second is how to determine whether the state-law 
claim merely parallels a federal law requirement. 
As to the first question, the courts should determine whether 
there is a federal requirement found either in the FDCA or its 
implementing regulations that clearly applies to the medical device 
at issue.  The requirement need not be device-specific but must 
clearly apply either to all devices of that category or to all medical 
devices.  This is a question of law that should be resolved by the 
court, not a question that should be left to the factfinder.  The 
factfinder’s role is to then determine whether the defendant has or 
has not complied with that requirement.  But if the applicability of 
the alleged federal “requirement” is not clear, then a jury should 
not be left to decide whether federal law could be interpreted to 
apply.  The court should first determine whether there is a legal 
requirement and leave to the factfinder only the question of 
whether that law has been violated.  And as to deciding the second 
question, courts should look carefully at the elements of both the 
federal and state law claims to see whether the elements necessary 
to prove a violation of federal law are the same as the elements 
necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, to prove the state-law 
claim.  If so, the state-law claim merely parallels the federal-law 
claim and is not expressly preempted by the MDA. 
Then, to determine whether a parallel state law claim is 
impliedly preempted, the courts must confront and resolve the 
question of Buckman’s scope.  Is it limited only to claims of a 
violation of the FDCA with no underlying preexisting state-law 
cause of action?  Or are even traditional state-law claims, such as 
negligence per se claims, preempted because they would not exist 
in the absence of a requirement established by federal law, the 
enforcement of which should be the exclusive province of the 
FDA? 
If the Supreme Court’s primary rationale for finding 
preemption in Buckman is that the FDCA does not create a private 
federal cause of action for enforcement of the act, then lower 
federal courts should distinguish between plaintiffs’ claims that 
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amount simply to a claim of an implied federal cause of action to 
enforce a federal requirement arising from the FDCA and state-law 
causes of action, such as negligence per se, in which a standard of 
conduct established by federal law is simply incorporated into the 
state-law claim, and not find preemption only in the latter kind of 
cases. 
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